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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines a critical aspect of the current Treaty of Waitangi 
settlement process - the Crown's decision to adopt a policy of negotiating and 
settling solely with "large natural groupings" of Maori. 
This paper argues that the large natural grouping policy is conceptually 
flawed and has the effect of shutting out the smaller groups which traditionally 
dominated Maori society, unless they amalgamate into larger groups. The 
result of this is that such groups often find their access to redress abrogated by 
settlements negotiated without their consent or involvement. 
This raises two significant problems for the settlement process. The first 
is that the flaws with the current process are alienating many groups, creating 
a very real risk that some supposedly "full and final" settlements will prove 
not to be, and instead require re-opening and re-negotiation. 
The second is the possibility that the process itself is adversely affecting 
the redevelopment of traditional Maori social structures, and is therefore 
creating new Treaty grievances. 
Given the problems with the policy, this paper argues that the Office of 
Treaty Settlements ought to commence negotiations with claimants free from 
the constraints of a non-negotiable bottom line on the level at which 
negotiations will occur. 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, contents page, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises about 14 300 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In his final speech as a Member of Parliament, the Rt Hon Sir Douglas 
Graham, the person responsible for driving Treaty of Waitangi (Treaty) 
settlement policy throughout the 1990s was involved in a short, bitter 
exchange with then opposition MP Tariana Turia, which proceeded as 
follows: 1 
Rt Hon. Sir DOUGLAS GRAHAM: If that member thinks we are going to deal 
with hapu settlements, she can forget it. There are thousands of them, and if she 
thinks the Crown is dividing people now, which we are certain ly not trying to do---
Tariana Turia: It's a treaty right. 
Rt Hon. Sir DOUGLAS GRAHAM: The member keeps talking about treaty 
rights. If the member does not want any settlements, and I know she does not, then, 
say we want to deal hapu by hapu, in a thousand years' time she will still be 
working it out and will still be arguing about the hapu rohe boundary. It is bad 
enough dealing at the iwi level, but that is another issue. 
This deceptively simple exchange, during the final speech of such a pivotal 
figure, reveals much about the way in which Treaty settlements have 
proceeded in New Zealand over the past few decades. It illustrates the 
problems involved in formulating a settlement policy, the sense of urgency 
that underpins it, and in the final sentence, the frustration that much of the 
public has with the existence of any process at all. Further, it questions the 
degree to which any process is, or should be, consistent with the Treaty itself. 
Since the 1980s, there has been an increased recognition and acceptance of 
the need to provide redress for historical Treaty of Waitangi grievances. The 
question of how to achieve this has vexed successive Governments, with the 
solution now seen as being in a process of direct settlement. 
1 Rt Hon Douglas Graham (5 October 1999) 580 NZPD 19590. 
2 
Direct settlement is the process whereby historical Treaty gnevances are 
settled between the Crown and Maori claimants in the political arena, rather 
than through the Courts, or the Waitangi Tribunal.2 Over the past decade, this 
process has developed to such a point where it is essentially the only way of 
obtaining a settlement for such grievances,3 and is certainly the method most 
favoured by the Government.4 During this period it has evolved from what 
was an ad-hoe, ill-planned (albeit well intentioned) scheme5 into a 
considerably more formal process. 
This paper will argue that this process has been constructed in such a way 
that the most fundamental element - that of whom the Crown will negotiate 
with - has been unsuitably defined. By engaging in a unilateral definitional 
exercise, the Crown has decided to negotiate solely with "large natural 
groupings". Maori society has traditionally been organised along smaller, hapu 
lines rather than in the larger groupings the Crown seeks to negotiate with. 
This paper will argue that in so doing, the Crown has created a situation which 
potentially shuts many of these smaller groups out of the settlement process 
altogether. 
The exclusion of smaller groups creates two significant and distinct 
problems. The first is that by electing to negotiate and settle claims with large 
natural groupings, the Crown may have excluded key interests, particularly 
those of smaller hapu. The implication of this is that these settlements may 
not stand up in the long term - a problem that will be accentuated as the pace 
2 Mason Durie Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self determination (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1998), 188; although frequently Waitangi Tribunal hearings are sought first, which then 
form the evidential basis for such negotiations. 
3 Except for the possibility which has existed since 1988 for the Waitangi Tribunal to make binding 
recommendations in some circumstances under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, ss 8A to 8HJ - to date 
only one binding recommendation has been made, in the Waitangi Tribunal Turangi Township Remedies 
Report (GP Publications, Wellington, 1998). However the Government, prompted by the legislation, acted 
before this came into force - see Janine Hayward "Three's a Crowd? The Treaty of Waitangi, the Waitangi 
Tribunal and Third Parties" (2002) 20 NZULR 240. 
4 
Evidenced by the increasing budget of the body responsible for these direct settlements, Office of Treaty 
Settlements, which now dwarfs that of the Waitangi Tribunal - See Alan Ward An Unsettled History -
Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1999), 41. 
5 See Ward, above, 25-40; "National Overview" (May 1997) Maori LR, 4; Douglas Graham Trick Or 
Treaty (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1995). 
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of settlements increases. The second problem is that the process itself may be 
a breach of the Treaty. 
However, as Douglas Graham alluded to in his exchange with Tariana 
Turia, this policy exists in order to create the possibility of final Treaty 
settlements within a finite time period. The political importance of such an 
outcome is huge, especially given the pressure from the public for the process 
to be conducted speedily. As such, it is necessary to consider whether the 
problems it causes can be justified in pursuit of this important goal. 
II GENESIS OF THE DIRECT SETTLEMENT PROCESS 
The formalisation of the Treaty settlement process started in 1992, when 
Cabinet decided to establish a new, comprehensive policy for Treaty claims 
relating to historical land grievances. 6 While a "Treaty of Waitangi Policy 
Unit" had been established by the Fourth Labour Government in the late 
1980s, it served mainly to co-ordinate policy development. 7 It was not until 
National gained power in the early 1990s that the Crown actively encouraged 
Maori claimants to enter into direct settlement negotiations, with or without a 
Waitangi Tribw1al hearing. 8 
The impetus behind the development of such a process9 was a desire 
amongst "virtually all" of the incoming MPs to have historical Treaty 
6 David Williams "Honouring the Treaty of Waitangi - Are the Parties Measuring Up?" (2002) 9 Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law 3, para 13; Office of Treaty Settlements Ka Tika a Muri, Ka Tika a 
Mua: Healing the Past, Building a Future (Wellington: 2002) 21. 
7 Alan Ward An Unsellled Histo,y - Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today (Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington, 1999), 41; Office of Treaty Settlements, above, 21 ; Note, however, that this body did draw up 
a series of very basic policies for the likely conduct of direct negotiations - see Treaty of Waitangi Policy 
Unit "The Direct Negotiation of Maori Claims" (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1990). 
8 Ward, above, 41. The Waitangi Tribunal is a body established by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 
empowered to investigate a claim by "any Maori" that they (either individually or as a member of a group) 
are, or are likely to be, prejudicially affected by legislation, regulations, policies or Crown acts and 
omissions which are inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty. If it finds that a claim is well-founded 
it may, if it thinks fit having regard to all the circumstances of the case, recommend to the Crown that 
action be taken to compensate for or remove the prejudice or to prevent other persons from being similarly 
affected in the future- Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s6. 
9 And concurrent weakening of the capacity of the Waitangi Tribunal, see Ward, above, 38-40. 
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settlements completed quickly. 10 As Hon John Luxton, the Minister of Maori 
Affairs at the time said, there was a need to "get them [historical claims] out of 
the way and have a clean slate as we move into the next century".
11 The 
policy for effecting such settlements, however, was largely unknown until late 
1994, with the public release of a set of proposals for the conduct of what was 
to be the "full and final settlement for all historical grievances".
12 
The Minister of Justice at the time (and Minister in Charge of Treaty of 
Waitangi Negotiations), the Rt Hon Douglas Graham noted that there were a 
number of issues which were worked through in this period, including: 13 
• Parameters in which settlements could be negotiated; 
• How to differentiate between "historical" and "contemporary" claims; 
• How the "proper claimant" could be identified, and how they would 
authorise their negotiators; 
• The procedure to be followed in negotiations; 14 
• Who would hold any assets transferred to Maori and on what terms; 
and 
• What assets could be included in a redress package. 
Graham notes that the resolution of these issues was not uncontroversial, 
even within Govenm1ent, with "[ d]iffering views held by officials [having to] 
'
0 Ward, above, 41 ; This can be seen in the contents of Cabinet documents during the period - particularly 
the paper dated I 6 September 1992 by Simon Murdoch, the chair of the Officials Committee (Strategy) to 
the Chair of the Cabinet Strategy Committee which observed "Officials have noted, from previous 
discussion by Ministers, that to "do nothing" is not an option" and that "Rather a decisive policy step 
which ends uncertainty and creates a new and different momentum in public policy is required" - see 
Officials Committee (Strategy) "Treaty of Waitangi: Principles for Settlement of Maori Claims" ( 16 
September 1992), discussed in Cabinet Minute "Principles for Settlement of Maori Claims" (21 September 
1992) CAB (92)M38/l 1. 
11 Hon John Luxton in (5 July 1994) The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, quoted in Cherryl Waerea-1-te-
Rangi Smith "The Treaty under Attack" in Auckland University Research Unit for Maori Education The 
Treaty Under Siege Monograph No 22, 7. 
12 David Williams "Honouring the Treaty of Waitangi - Are the Parties Measuring Up?" (2002) 9 
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 3, para 13. 
13 See Douglas Graham Trick Or Treaty (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington , 1995), 55. 
14 Although, interestingly Graham states that this "was more an internal matter for the Government" , 
suggesting that consultation was not considered as necessary for this aspect of the settlement process . 
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be resolved at the Cabinet table". 15 After the internal dialogue within Cabinet, 
and between officials, the Government produced a booklet detailing their 
proposals. 16 It is notable that this entire process was conducted with 
"negligible Maori input". 17 
Post-release discussion around the mechanics of the proposed scheme 
appears to have been eclipsed by what Graham later described as the "most 
controversial decision that was made by the government at the time". 18 This 
decision was to set a "fair yet affordable" 19 sum, $1 billion over a ten year 
period, as the limit of total Government expenditure, including both cash and 
the value of land and other natural resources for Treaty settlements.20 
The rationale for a fiscal cap was first to reassure people (including many 
in Cabinet) that the process was affordable, and secondly to reinforce the 
finality of settlements.21 The fiscal cap was to be made permanent by placing 
'relativity clauses' in settlements, whereby, when settling, claimants were 
assured that their settlement would amount to a certain percentage of the total 
amount spent on settlements (based on the $1 billion cap). 22 If future 
governments were to reopen settlements with one claimant, they would be 
obliged by these clauses to reopen all settlements, at considerable expense. 
15 Graham, above, 55. 
16 See Office of Treaty Settlements Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims 
(Detailed Proposals) (Wellington, 1995). 
7 Mason Durie Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: the politics of Maori self-determination (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1998), 190-191. 
18 Graham, above, 58, 64. 
19 Graham, above, 60. 
20 David Williams "Honouring the Treaty of Waitangi - Are the Parties Measuring Up?" (2002) 9 
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 3, para 13. 
21 Graham, above, 58-59; see also Cabinet Minute "Treaty of Waitangi: Settlement Policies: Ensuring 
Finality" (I O October 1994) CAB(94)M38/7. 
22 Graham, above, 58-59; although it appears that the concept of placing such clauses in settlement deeds 
arose during the negotiation of particular settlements, rather than as a policy developed in the abstract, as 
the concept is conspicuously absent from the Cabinet papers which preceded the settlement proposals, 
particularly from the cabinet minute detailing measures taken to ensure finality- Cabinet Minute "Treaty 
of Waitangi: Settlement Policies: Ensuring Finality" (10 October I 994) CAB(94)M38/7. 
6 
It was the $1 billion cap which raised the ire of those who attended the 
thirteen hui following the release of the Crown's proposals,23 while issues 
such as mandating of negotiators, governance structures and the negotiation 
process itself "seemed to raise little passion".24 The minutiae of the proposals 
appears to have been overshadowed by what was rejected by even moderate 
and conservative Maori as an outrageous decision to limit the budget for 
settlements in such a way.25 
That is not to say that the issues of process were entirely ignored. Of 
2077 submissions received on the Crown's proposals, at least 869 rejected the 
proposals outright as a result of their unilateral development.26 Furthermore, 
some submitters made specific suggestions about representation, although the 
report of submissions notes (perhaps unsurprisingly) "[t]hese suggestions 
often conflicted with one another".27 At a hui called by Sir Hepi Te Heuheu in 
January 1995, the policies were criticised as being designed to protect the 
Government and provide assurances for the general populace rather than 
having as their primary focus the provision of a just remedy for past 
injustices.28 Professor Mason Durie suggests that there was also concern 
about the impact of the policies on smaller, ill-resourced groups.29 
23 For a detailed (albeit biased) account of the proceedings of these hui, see Wira Gardiner Return to 
Sender: What really happened at the fiscal envelope hui (Reed, Auckland, 1996). 
24 Hon Douglas Graham Trick Or Treaty (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1995), 64. 
25 See Alan Ward An Unsettled History - Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today (Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington, 1999), 52. 
26 See Te Puni Kokiri Report of Submissions: Crown Proposals for Treaty of Waitangi Claims 
(Wellington, 1995) 5. 
27 Te Puni Kokiri , above, 92-93. These submissions variously suggested that whanau, hapu or iwi were the 
desirable vehicle for negotiations. 
28 JH Roberts Alternative vision - He moemoea ano:fromfiscal envelope to constitutional change: the 
significance of the Hirangi Hui in Craig Coxhead " Where are the Negotiations in the Direct Negotiations 
of Treaty Settlements?" (2002) 10 Waikato LR 13, 24; see also M H Durie "Proceedings of a Hui held at 
H irangi Marae, Turangi" in Geoff Mc Lay ( ed) Treaty Settlements: The Unfinished Business (Institute of 
Policy Studies, Wellington, 1995). 
29 Mason Durie Te mana, te kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self-determination (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1998) 188. 
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While the concept of a fiscal cap appears to have disappeared (for now) 
from the settlement process,30 the remainder of the 1994 proposals remain, 
largely unaltered, in the current settlement policy. Any major changes made to 
the policies have also been made without consultation with Maori. 31 
III THE CURRENT SETTLEMENT PROCESS 
The current iteration of the Government's Treaty settlement protocols can 
be found in Ka tika a rnuri, ka tika a rnua: Healing the past, building a future, 
produced by the Office of Treaty Settlements32 in 2002.33 In the foreword, 
Hon Margaret Wilson, the current Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi 
Negotiations, outlines the goal of the process as ensuring that settlements are 
"fair, affordable and lasting".34 
It is pertinent to note at this stage that there is no legislation underpinning 
these protocols, and that they are simply Government policies. 
30 See Office of Treaty Settlements "Ka Tika a Muri, Ka Tika a Mua: Healing the Past, Building a Future" 
(Wellington: 2002) 30; and Hon Margaret Wilson 's statement that the Labour led Government has "now 
moved entirely away from the fiscal envelope concept in planning" Hon Margaret Wilson "Principles to 
guide settlement of Treaty claims" (3 August 2000) Press Release. However, note that while the rhetoric of 
a ' fiscal cap' has disappeared, one of the Crown's negotiating principles remains 'fa irness between claims ', 
meaning that similar claims should receive a similar level of redress. Given that key early settlements were 
negotiated within the framework ofa fiscal cap, it is difficult to see how this policy can mean anything 
other than the fiscal cap model is still adhered to - see also Craig Coxhead "Where are the Negotiations in 
the Direct Negotiations of Treaty Settlements?" (2002) I O Waikato LR 13 , 26-27; and Tom Bennion "New 
principles to guide the settlement of historical Treaty claims" (July 2000) Maori LR which notes that "the 
harsh relativity clauses of the Tainui and Ngai Tahu settlements make it difficult for any government to 
stray too far from the $1 billion figure for all major settlements". 
31 Such as the adoption of a "principles" framework in July 2000, and moves to "streamline" Treaty claims 
in February 2002 - Coxhead, above, 25. 
32 The Office of Treaty Settlements is a separate unit within the Ministry of Justice reporting directly to the 
Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations. It was established in January 1995 to manage 
historical Treaty settlements - Office of Treaty Settlements, above, 23. 
33 Office of Treaty Settlements, above. 
34 Office of Treaty Settlements, above, 4. 
35 
8 
A "Large Natural Groupings" 
To guide the settlement process, the document outlines certain "key 
settlement policies" which provide, inter alia, that the Crown seeks a 
"comprehensive settlement of all claims of a claimant group" in order to ensure 
that all historical grievances have been addressed.35 While this appears to be a 
noble aim, it is potentially compromised by the next policy, which baldly 
states that "[t]he Crown strongly prefers to negotiate claims with large natural 
groupings rather than individual whanau and hapu".36 
The Crown has thus decided to define the Maori Treaty partner for the 
purposes of historical settlements in terms of' large natural groupings'. This is 
an important decision, with considerable influence on how the settlement 
process is conducted. 
By its very nature this is also a difficult decision. The question of the 
identity of the Maori Treaty partner, and particularly the level of Maori 
society at which to pursue Treaty negotiations, is a vexed one. The area is so 
complicated and the number of considerations and possibilities so vast that 
any decisions which are made will be controversial.37 
Maori society is organised in many ways, but iwi, hapu and whanau are 
the main traditional categories.38 lwi are the largest grouping, followed by 
hapu, whereas whanau groups consist mainly of the extended family. Both iwi 
and hapu are primarily organised along the lines of whakapapa, or direct 
descent from a common ancestor.39 
Office of Treaty Settlements, above, 32. 
36 I Office of Treaty Sett ements, above, 32. 
37 
See Kirsty Gover and N atalie Baird " Identifying the Maori Treaty Pa,tner" (2002) 32 Univ of Toronto L 
J 39, 40; Tom Bennion "Who Represents Maori Groups?" (Nov 1994) Maori LR, I; Paul Meredith 
"Seeing the " Maori Subject" : Some Discussion Points" (Draft, Te Matahauariki Institute, University of 
Waikato). 
38 
Angela Ballara /wi: The Dynamics of Maori Tribal Organisation from cl769 to c /9-15 (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, l 998), 17. 
39 
Ballara, above, 17. 
9 
B Development 
It was known from a very early stage in the development of the direct 
settlement process that problems could arise with the definition of whom to 
negotiate and settle with. A Cabinet paper dated 28 June 1993 notes " [ w] i th 
every claim there is an inherent risk for the Crown that it may not be dealing 
with the appropriate representatives of the claimants".40 While this appears to 
be more directly concerned with the issue of mandating rather than with the 
appropriate level with which to deal, the footnoted text reveals that the 
problem can arise in three ways, one of which is that "the wider group (e.g., 
iwi) does not represent the interests of a sub-group (e.g., hapu) within the 
claimant group with respect to some particular land etc". 41 The paper goes on 
to say ( emphasis added):42 
[o]ne approach could be for the Crown to state its position that it will only settle 
claims with iwi , rather than hapu or individual Maori . This would not remove the 
problem of overlapping claims, but would reduce it. To be effective this position 
may need to be incorporated in legislation. This issue is likely to be particularly 
controversial for Maori and would require discussion and consultation. The Treaty 
in its Maori version protects both iwi and hapu. 
The issue was again raised in a report ordered by Cabinet from an ad hoe 
committee of officials in July 1994.43 This paper also noted the importance of 
getting representation issues right - "[ e ]xcluding the right people or including 
the wrong people can both result in new grievances",44 and that "[a] particular 
40 Officials Strategy Committee "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Fund: Size, Shape, Timescale and the 
Reciprocation from Maori" (28 June 1993) CSC (93) 90, para 64. 
4 1 Officials Strategy Committee "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Fund: Size, Shape, Timescale and the 
Reciprocation from Maori" (28 June 1993) CSC (93) 90, 17 fn I. 
42 Officials Strategy Committee "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Fund: Size, Shape, Timescale and the 
Reciprocation from Maori" (28 June 1993) CSC (93) 90, para 67 . 
43 Ad Hoe Officials Committee "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Policies: Outstanding Matters" (I O October 
1994) csc (94) 140. 
44 Ad Hoe Officials Committee "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Policies: Outstanding Matters" ( I O October 
1994) csc (94) 140, 2. 
10 
concern 1s that minority interests are protected against an oppressive 
majority".45 
When the specific point of which group to deal with was considered, the 
report noted that "[ a]ggregating grievances into a wider group, e.g. hapu 
grievances being subsumed at the iwi level emphasises the overall nature of 
grievance felt by Maori but could lead to settlements that are not seen to 
extinguish highly specific grievances". 46 The report did not express any 
ultimate view as to the level at which claims should be pursued, but did note 
that the issue should be addressed.47 Cabinet also noted the issue at the 
October 1994 meeting that considered the report.48 
The October 1994 meeting was the last time that Cabinet considered the 
issue before the settlement proposals were released for public consultation (in 
the "fiscal envelope" hui). The Crown did not put forward a finn view as to 
what its preference was, and a perusal of the proposals reveals that they 
appear to have left the question of what level of Maori society to deal with 
open.49 In the course of consultation, as was noted above, there were various 
suggestions as to what the appropriate level was. 50 While the Crown's report 
of submissions noted that they often "conflicted with each other", there were 
45 Ad Hoe Officials Committee "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Policies: Outstanding Matters" ( I O October 
1994) CSC (94) 140, 2 - the sentence continues "[and] the majority against an unreasonable minority"; 
this has resonance with the terms of the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, sl7(2)(d) which strikes a similar 
balance in terms of interests in land. 
46 Ad Hoe Officials Committee "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Policies: Outstanding Matters" (10 October 
1994) csc (94) 140, 3. 
47 Ad Hoe Officials Committee "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Policies: Outstanding Matters" ( 10 October 
1994) CSC (94) I 40, 10. 
48 Cabinet Minute "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Policies: Outstanding Matters" ( I 7 October 1994) CAB 
(94) M 39/11, (b)(iii). 
49 See Office of Treaty Settlements Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims 
(Detailed Proposals) (Wellington, 1995), 42-43 where the same questions raised in the Cabinet papers re-
rcP'i':a~uni Kokiri Report of Submissions: Crown Proposals f or Treaty of Waitangi Claims (Wellington, 
1995), 92-93 . These submissions variously suggesting that whanau, hapu or iwi were the desirable vehicle 
for negotiations. 
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clear statements in the submissions that the Crown would at the very least 
need to leave open the possibility of dealing with smaller groups. 51 
The fiscal envelope hui was the last time the policy was put up for public 
consultation. An inter-departmental working group then examined proposals 
for negotiations processes and recommended, inter alia, that "the Government 
explicitly place a priority on negotiating and settling claims brought by iwi or 
confederations of iwi". 52 This was subsequently approved by the Cabinet 
Strategy Committee,53 and reflected in the Crown's settlement guide. 54 
The preference for dealing solely with iwi has subsequently changed to a 
preference for dealing solely with ' large natural groupings'. The change 
occurred, according to current Office of Treaty Settlements director Andrew 
Hampton, in recognition of "the diversity of Maori political organisation". 55 
Despite this change in policy, smaller groups are still unable to negotiate 
directly as they do not fit the Crown's criteria for what constitutes a "large 
natural grouping". 56 This is, in Hampton's words, in order "to accommodate 
the reality that a settlement with each registered claimant is unsustainable". 57 
51 See Te Puni Kokiri, above, 93 - these included "Whanau should sometimes be considered appropriate 
mandating groups"; "Hapu are the mandated negotiating body for iwi" ; "The Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed 
hapu ownership so one person should not negotiate on behalf of iwi". It should be noted, that there were 
also contrary submissions which suggested that iwi should generally be the negotiating body, with hapu 
negotiations occurring rarely. 
52 Ministry of Justice "Treaty Settlement Policies: Reports from working groups" (5 July 1996) CSC (96) 
127, paras 14, 45. 
53 Cabinet Strategy Committee "Treaty Settlement Policies: Reports from Working Groups" (10 July 
1996) CSC (96) M22/8. 
54 See Office of Treaty Settlements Ka Tika a Muri, Ka Tika a Mua : Healing the Past, Building a Future 
~Wellington: 1999), 24. 
5 Response from Andrew Hampton, Director, Office of Treaty Settlements to a request from the author 
under the Official Information Act 1982 (17 June 2003). 
56 These factors include relevant Waitangi Tribunal findings ; whether the group has a distinctive area of 
mterest; whakapapa, tipuna, iwi , hapu, marae; and ( crucially) the relative size of the group in terms of its 
population and rohe - response from Andrew Hampton, Director, Office of Treaty Settlements to a request 
from the author under the Official Information Act 1982 ( 17 June 2003). 
57 Response from Andrew Hampton, Director, Office of Treaty Settlements to a request from the author 
under the Official Information Act 1982 ( 17 June 2003). 
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C Justification for Policy 
The Crown's justification for the policy (as set out in Healing the Past) is 
that it "makes the process of settlement easier to manage and work through, 
and helps deal with overlapping interests" as well as reducing costs for both 
the Crown and claimants.58 
The Office of Treaty Settlements explored these reasons in more detail in a 
recent report to the Maori Affairs Select Committee, which stated: 59 
[s]ettling all the claims of large natural groups (as opposed to the claims of small 
groups such as individual hapu) is the key to completing the settlement process 
expeditiously . Paradoxically, the settlement process will be prolonged if the 
Government attempts to increase the pace of settlement by negotiating with small 
groups . 
This line of reasoning has also been endorsed by the current Minister m 
Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, the Hon Margaret Wilson.60 
The rationale for the policy can clearly be seen to be expedience, that is, 
making the goal of final settlements easier to achieve from the Crown' s 
perspective. There is no evidence that the policy even considered which group 
Maori identified as most suitable, or was most representative of past or 
present notions of Maori social organisation. 
58 Office of Treaty Settlements Ka Tika a Muri, Ka Tika a Mua : Healing the Past, Building a Future 
~Wellington: 2002), 44. 
9 Office of Treaty Settlements "Paper to Maori Affairs Committee Re: Speeding up of Historical Treaty 
Settlements" (8 October 2002); see also Office of Treaty Settlements Briefing to the Incoming Minister in 
Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations (Wellington, 2002). 
60 See Written Question from Rt Hon Winston Peters to Hon Margaret Wilson (24 October 2002) 54 
NZPD Q Supp 2655 , question No 11982, where Ms Wilson stated " [n] egotiations with smaller groups, or 
negotiations covering only some of the claims of the group (non-comprehensive settlements) will mean 
more negotiations are required than otherwise, and this will tend to delay completion of the settlement 
process." 
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Indeed, as identified above, the entire policy, including the decision to 
negotiate solely with Large Natural Groupings was reached with minimal 
consultation with Maori. 61 The risk is that the Crown may not be negotiating 
with the right people, and consequently that settlements could both overlook 
the grievances of the some groups and potentially create new ones. 
IV CA USE FOR CONCERN? 
The current settlement process, and its outcome, can be seen as 
problematic. As outlined above, the goal of the process is, from the Crown's 
perspective, to obtain full and final settlements of historical Treaty grievances 
by way of negotiation. Crucial to achieving this goal is ensuring that the 
Crown is negotiating with the correct representatives of the other Treaty 
partner, that is, Maori; and also that it is not creating new grievances in the 
process. 
The issue of correctly identifying the Treaty partner is important. For the 
process to be successful it must, according to Kirsty Gover and Natalie Baird 
in a recent University of Toronto Law Journal article, promote "buy-in" from 
a wide spectrum of Maori.62 However, as Baird and Gover point out, the 
contemporary Treaty relationship has been "conceptualized in government 
rhetoric and popular discourse as a binary, quasi-diplomatic partnership 
between two centralized and homogenous polities".63 This attitude can be seen 
in the development of the large natural grouping policy. The Crown opted to 
define the Treaty partner as the group which best suited their desire for 
speedy and cost-effective settlements. 
61 Except for the opportunity to comment generally on the issue of claimant representation in the context of 
the "fiscal envelope hui" described above, which as noted returned a variety of responses detailed in Te 
Puni Kokiri Report of Submissions: Crown Proposals for Treaty of Waitangi Claims (Wellington, 1995), 
92-93 . 
62 Kirsty Gover and Natalie Baird "Identifying the Maori Treaty Pa,tner" (2002) 32 Univ of Toronto L J 
39, 40. 
63 Gover and Baird, above, 39-40. 
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A A Unprincipled Approach? 
Gover and Baird argue that the effect of approaching definition issues in 
this way is to fail to recognise a Treaty status for "non-traditional Maori 
collectives". 64 However, when one unpacks the current framework for the 
negotiation and settlement of historical Treaty grievances, it becomes apparent 
that it is not only non-traditional collectives that are shut out of the process. 
While the term "large natural group" is not strictly defined, the factors which 
the Crown takes into account before entering into negotiations with a group 
are such that it is virtually impossible for any groups other than iwi, large 
hapu, or sizable confederations of hapu to satisfy the criteria. 65 The reason 
why "large hapu or confederations of hapu" may qualify is, according to the 
Office of Treaty Settlements and Te Puni Kokiri, because they function " in 
similar ways to iwi" .66 
The effect of the policy is that the Crown will seek to negotiate the direct 
settlement of historical grievances with iwi, and certain large hapu that 
function like iwi. 
However, such an approach is inconsistent with modem historical and 
anthropological thought, which is firm on the point that it was hapu and not 
iwi which were (and arguably still are) the primary vehicles of Maori political 
64 Gover and Baird, above, 39-40. 
65 These factors include relevant Waitangi Tribunal findings ; whether the group has a distinctive area of 
interest; whakapapa, tipuna, iwi, hapu, marae; and ( crucially) the relative size of the group in terms of its 
population and rohe - Response from Andrew Hampton, Director, Office of Treaty Settlements to a request 
from the author under the Official Information Act 1982 ( 17 June 2003). 
66 Response from Andrew Hampton, Director, Office of Treaty Settlements to a request from the author 
under the Official Information Act 1982 ( 17 June 2003); Response from Leith Comer, Chief Executive, Te 
Puni Kokiri to a request from the author under the Official Information Act 1982 ( 12 August 2003). 
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organisation. 67 The Waitangi Tribunal has also repeatedly acknowledged 
this. 68 
As academics from Victoria University's Treaty of Waitangi Research 
Unit sununarised "[i]n 1840 hapu, which may be fewer than one hundred or 
up to a thousand people was the effective social and political unit of Maori 
society, although in times of war or other crises hapu may combine into larger 
iwi groups."69 
The trend towards viewing iwi as the primary actors has emerged largely in 
the colonial context due to the desire by officials to find a "comprehensible 
and comprehensive hierarchical body politic with which to negotiate land 
purchases". 70 This effect was compounded by the need to respond to the 
challenges posed by colonisation - challenges best met in a larger collective 
unit. 71 The primacy of iwi within the Maori political order can thus, be seen 
as largely a Pakeha construct, as well as a response to the effects of 
colonisation. 72 It 1s interesting to note that this phenomenon of 
misunderstanding or deliberate manipulation fornung the basis of ' traditional' 
identification is not unique to New Zealand, and has occurred in the colonial 
context in other countries as well. 73 
67 See Angela Ballara lwi: The Dynamics of Maori Tribal Organisation from cl769 to c/945 (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1998); Steven C Bourassa and Ann Louise Strong "Restitution of Land to 
New Zealand Maori: The Role of Social Structure" (2002) 75 Pacific Affairs 162; Steven Webster "Maori 
Retribalisation and Treaty Rights to New Zealand Fisheries" (2002) 14 The Contemporary Pacific 341; see 
also the texts of the Treaty of Waitangi itself, where the word ' tribes ' in the English text was translated as 
' hapu ' in the Maori version. 
68 Waitangi Tribunal Ngati Awa Raupatu Report: Wai -16, (GP Publications, Wellington, 1999), 132; 
Waitangi Tribunal The Fisheries Setl!ement Report: Wai 307, (Brooker & Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1992), 
12; Waitangi Tribunal Ngati Awa Settlement Cross-Claims Report: Wai 958, (Legislation Direct, 
Wellington , 2002), 72. 
69 Richard Hill and Vincent O'Malley The Maori Quest for Rangatiratanga I Autonomy 1840-2000 (Treaty 
of Waitangi Research Unit, Wellington, 2000), 1-2. 
70 Ballara, above, 59, 70, 81 ; see also Lindsay Cox Kotahitanga: the search for Maori political unity 
~Oxfo rd University Press, Auckland, l 993) 141. 
1 Hill and O'Malley, above, 2. 
72 See Wayne Rumbles "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Process: New Relationship or New Mask" (Paper 
Presented at Compr(om)ising Post Colonisation Conference, Woolongong, I 0-13 February 1999), I O; this 
has subsequently been published in Dr Greg Ratcliffe (ed) Compr(om)ising Postcolonialism(s): Challenging 
Narratives and Practices (Dangaroo Press, Sydney, 2002). 
73 See Eric Hobsbawn and Terrence Ranger (eds) The invention of Tradition (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); particularly note Terence Ranger "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa" 
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While the policies for the conduct of direct settlement emerged during the 
1990s, there has been an extensive body of peer critiqued anthropological 
research into this area since the mid 1970s. As anthropologist Stephen 
Webster put it74 : 
[t]he current expansion and urgency of historical research in Maori land and fisheries 
grievances has found itself in need of a far better understanding of Maori kinship. At 
first glance, it appeared that social anthropology had been remiss in contributing to a 
better understanding of either kinship or land. An examination of the history of 
social anthropology and Maori Studies shows, however, that important fundamental 
research had been undertaken and critiqued by 1975. 
As such, there is, and has been for some time, a substantial body of 
evidence as to the actual nature of Maori society. However, much policy and 
academic work, including the "Large Natural Grouping" policy, does not 
reflect this. Rather, these policies are reminiscent of the traditional, flawed 
assumption that iwi are the paramount bodies, commanding obedience from 
hapu, who in turn command obedience from whanau. As respected historian 
Alan Ward put it: 75 
the supposedly neat hierarchy of whanau, hapu, and iwi , with its rangatira and its 
ariki (a tidy pyramidal model which still gets trotted out in anthropology and 
sociology that feeds upon previous publication rather than unde1taking original 
research or checking the most recent writings) was not actually like that. 
Thus, by choosing to negotiate almost solely with iwi, the Government is 
choosing a model inconsistent with tikanga. As such the Crown may well be 
at 247-252 where it is noted that "Modern Central Africa tribes are not so much survivals from a pre-
colonial past but rather largely colonial creations by colonial officers and African intellectuals" . 
74 Stephen Webster "Maori hapuu and their history" ( 1997) 8 Australian Journal of Anthropology 307. 
75 Alan Ward "Historical claims under the Treaty of Waitangi" ( I 993) 28 Journal of Pacific History 181 
quoted in Webster, above. 
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negotiating with the wrong groups and may therefore also be prejudicing its 
goal of obtaining 'full and final settlements'. 
This is the result of what Gover and Baird describe as the "primary 
impulse of governments to date" to engage in "largely unilateral definitional 
exercises, effectively removing the debate about Maori identity from 
Maoridom". 76 Dr David Willian1s of the University of Auckland has called 
this approach to mandating issues the "one major flaw" of the modern Treaty 
settlement process. 77 
B Relevance Today 
The decision to ignore hapu is not one of solely academic concern, and has 
been criticised by many Maori. At a hui held at Taupo in July 2003 by the 
Ministry of Justice as part of a review of the court system, the policy was 
repeatedly criticised by those present. Comments included ( direct quotes 
unless otherwise noted): 78 
• [The] Government only wants to deal with " large natural groups" and therefore 
not hapu ; 
• [T]he Crown is making Maori/whanau hapu join into "Large Natural Groups" to 
settle claims leaving the benefit to the whanau/hapu going to the "Large Natural 
Groups" ie whanau/hapu miss out; 
• Maori are hapu based yet the Crown [only negotiates] with ... "Large Natural 
Groups"; 
• Large Natural Groups policy dictates how Maori must organise themselves 
• The Crown needs to recognise hapu ; 
76 Kirsty Gover and Natalie Baird " Identifying the Maori Treaty Partner" (2002) 32 Univ of Toronto L J 
39, 40. 
77 David Williams "Honouring the Treaty of Waitangi - Are the Pa11ies Measuring Up?" (2002) 9 
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 3, para 2; see also Dr Joan Metge "S ubmission to the Maori 
Affairs Select Committee on the Runanga lwi Bill" (MA/90/85 , 14 February 1990) which criticises the 
Governments attempts to rigid ly define "the essential characteristics of iwi" by law; and see generally the 
Interim Report of the Maori Affairs Committee on the Runanga lwi Bill [ 1990] AJHR I. I OA. 
78 Ministry of Justice Hui Report: Seeking Solutions (Wellington, 2003) 39-42, 47. 
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• Recognise that if ' hapu' want to be ' hapu ' let them be. This is our legal entity. 
Hapu are recognised in the Treaty; 
• Have hapu as the legal entity; 
• Governance of hapu is not corporate; 
• Current models mean the hapu are not really heard; 
• Can ' t just rubber stamp models , and then call them Maori ; 
• [Current] [s]ettlement structures are government structures - not iwi / hapu / 
whanau; 
• How Maori organise themselves is for them to work out; 
• Settle hapu by hapu . 
Thus the prominence of the hapu has not disappeared. These comments 
suggest that the current policy is not satisfactory to smaller groups in 
Maoridom (i.e. whanau / hapu). Forcing hapu to amalgamate together for the 
purpose of settlements can surely not then be seen as a principled approach. 
V PRACTICAL EFFECTS 
The lack of a principled basis could perhaps be seen as acceptable if the 
policy was actually working in practice. However, as the number of 
settlements increases the adverse effects of this policy are being increasingly 
felt. 
The large natural grouping policy means that rather than smaller groups 
such as hapu being able to enter into direct negotiations with the Crown, they 
are forced to amalgamate together under the banner of an iwi or a sui generis 
body constructed for the purpose of settlements. The potential for smaller 
groups to have their interests prejudiced in this process is large, as their 
concerns and aspirations could be eclipsed by the interests of the larger group. 
Furthermore, as the Waitangi Tribunal noted in 1999 "often bitter" struggles 
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between hapu which were "thought once to have died" resurface when claims 
are heard and settlements negotiated. 79 
The scope for injustice is aggravated by two further elements of settlement 
policy - the policy of seeking comprehensive settlements, and the steps taken 
to ensure finality of settlements. In a nutshell, what the Crown is seeking is 
"settlements ... with large natural groupings of claimants, for all of their 
historical claims, in a way which ensures the settlements will be lasting". 80 
A Comprehensive Settlements 
In Healing the Past, the Office of Treaty Settlements states that the 
Crown "strongly prefers to negotiate settlements of all the historical claims ... 
of a claimant group at the same tirne". 81 What this means is that once a 
mandate is accepted, the Crown will proceed to negotiate a settlement which 
covers all of the hapu and whanau present in the area. Such settlements will 
include "all claims of the group whether the claims have arisen or been 
considered, researched, registered, notified or made on or before the settlement 
is reached". 82 
In the context of the large natural grouping policy this means that the 
Crown will look for a large natural group with which it can conduct 
negotiations for the comprehensive settlement of all claims of the groups it 
purports to represent. The prospect is that these larger groups may claim to 
represent smaller groups who do not accept the mandate of the larger group to 
do so. If this is the case, the policy of seeking comprehensive settlements may 
79 Comments reproduced in Tom Bennion "Whanganui River claims of Atihaunui and Tamahaki" (March 
I 999) Maori LR 4. 
80 Office of Treaty Settlements Briefing to the Incoming Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi 
Negotiations (Wellington, 2002), 2.5.2. 
81 Office of Treaty Settlements Ka Tika a Muri, Ka Tika a M11a: Healing the Past, Building a Future 
(Wellington: 2002), 44. 
82 Letter from Tony Sole, Manager, Claims Development, Office of Treaty Settlements to Rawinia Konui 
( 18 August 2003), which describes the policy in relation to the Ngati Tuwharetoa negotiation process. 
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mean that these smaller groups find their claims subsumed, even though they 
have not themselves consented to this. 
B "Finality" 
The desire to achieve comprehensive settlements is augmented by the main 
aim of the Treaty settlement process - that is to obtain full and final 
settlements of historical Treaty grievances. To this end, the redress provided 
by the Crown in settlements is offered "in total satisfaction of the grievance 
for all time". 83 Such a policy is consistent with the Crown's intention to put 
the issues of past grievances behind them. 84 This paper will not traverse the 
subject of whether such settlements are necessarily desirable. 85 However, the 
means by which the Government is seeking to ensure this finality are 
concerning. 
Finality is ensured by the inclusion of a prov1s1on m the settlement 
legislation that the settlement is final, backed up by provisions stopping any 
possibility of the settlement being re-opened by either the comis or the 
Waitangi Tribunal. 86 Obviously, such provisions provide "powerful structural 
barriers to prevent Maori from pursuing their Treaty claims in the future". 87 
These barriers can be seen in the wording of such provisions in settlement 
legislation passed to date. 88 
83 Office of Treaty Settlements, above 32; the quote is from Barney Riley "Mocked before the ink is dry on 
the statute? Final Settlements of Treaty of Waitangi Claims" (LLB(Hons) Research Paper, Otago 
University, 1994) 16. 
84 Hon Douglas Graham insight '94, National Radio, 25 July 1994, quoted in Riley, above, 16. 
85 Note, however, that the Waitangi Tribunal has opined that the concept of finality was "clearly 
inconsistent with the Treaty" - Waitangi Tribunal The Fisheries Settlement Report: Wai 307, (Wellington, 
1992) I 0, and that if tribal leaders were to sign such final settlements it would serve "only to destabilise 
their authority" - Waitangi Tribunal Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi: Wai 1./3 (Wellington, 1996) 
314. 
86 Office of Treaty Settlements Ka Tika a Muri, Ka Tika a Mua : Healing the Past, Building a Future 
(Wellington: 2002), 77. 
87 Annie Mikaere "Settlement of Treaty Claims: Full and Final, or Fatally Flawed?" (1997) 17 NZULR 
425 , 454. 
88 See, for example, the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998, s46 l (3), which states: 
Despite any other enactment or rule of law, no court or tribunal has jurisdiction to inquire or 
further inquire into, or to make any finding or recommendation in respect of,---
(a) Any or all of the Ngai Tahu claims; or 
(b) The validity of the deed of settlement; or 
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The combination of the comprehensive settlement and finality policies is 
that once a claimant group has negotiated a settlement, the legislation that 
gives effect to it will remove any possibility for smaller groups not involved in 
the settlement process to pursue their claims. 
C The Crown's Answer 
The Office 'of Treaty Settlements argues that it has processes in place to 
ensure that the settlement policy does not compromise hapu or whanau 
interests. These processes are effective, according to the Office, as they 
require "a transparent and inclusive mandating process, offering specific 
redress to [smaller] groups and providing an opportunity for all claimants to 
participate in the acceptance of a settlement offer through a ratification 
process". 89 
Furthermore, in Healing the Past, it was noted that in some cases specific 
smaller claims from whanau and hapu "can be addressed within the 
comprehensive settlement".90 Andrew Hampton points to the return of 
Turuturu Mokai Reserve to Ngati Tupaia Hapu in the Ngati Ruanui settlement 
as an example of this.91 
However, none of this removes the fact that hapu are forced to work 
within an imposed structure, which does not necessarily suit them. The return 
of the Turuturu Mokai Reserve was negotiated within the "Large Natural 
Grouping" framework, and title to the reserve vested not in the Hapu, but in 
(c) The adequacy of the benefits provided to Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu 
and others under this Act or the deed of settlement; or 
( d) This Act . 
89 Response from Andrew Hampton, Director, Office of Treaty Settlements to a request from the author 
under the Official Information Act 1982 ( 17 June 2003). 
90 Office of Treaty Settlements Ka Tika a Muri, Ka Tika a Mua : Healing the Past, Building a Future 
(Wellington: 2002), 66 . 
91 Response from Andrew Hampton, Director, Office of Treaty Settlements to a request from the author 
under the Official Information Act 1982 ( 17 June 2003). 
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Te Runanga o Ngaati Ruanui Trust, the entity representing the Iwi as a 
whole.92 This process did not stop a number of whanau and hapu from 
rejecting the settlement, and even going so far as to travel to Wellington to 
object at the first reading of the settlement legislation. 93 
D The Policy in Practice 
The effectiveness of both the policy and the Crown's attempts to mitigate 
any problems with it can be gauged by examining the extent to which it is 
causing problems in practice. 
The most obvious manifestation of these problems can be seen in a number 
of cases where smaller groups have taken steps to challenge settlements 
negotiated by larger entities out of a concern that their interests will be 
subsumed within a wider settlement without their consent or involvement. 
1 Te Atiawa 
Such a challenge occurred during the Te Atiawa settlement. In its Taranaki 
report, the Waitangi Tribunal listed the hapu groupings with which the 
Government should enter into settlement negotiations with. 94 One of these 
was Te Atiawa, a group of six hapu, one of which was the Puketapu hapu. 
These six hapu formed the Te Atiawa Iwi Authority Incorporated (TAIA) as a 
vehicle through which to pursue negotiations with the Crown.95 
What followed was described by Doogue J in the following terms: " [i]t 
appears that some time during 1995 before the incorporation of T AIA there 
was a change in the relationship between the Puketapu hapu and other hapus 
[sic] within the Te Atiawa iwi".96 
92 See Ngati Ru anui Claims Settlement Act 2003 , s 34 . 
93 This was noted at the time by Metiria Turei (3 October 2002) 603 NZPD 885-887 . 
94 Waitangi Tribunal Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi: Wai 1-13 (GP Publications , Wellington , 1996). 
95 Kai Tahu Tahu O Puketapu Hapu lnc v Attorney-General & Te Atiawa Jwi Authority (5 February 1999) 
High Court, Wellington , CP344/97 Doogue J, 2-4. 
96 Kai Tahu Tahu O Puketapu Hapu Inc v Attorney-General & Te Atiawa Jwi Authority , above, 3 . 
23 
When, in 1996, T AIA lodged a claim by way of deed of mandate on behalf 
of the other five hapu, the Puketapu hapu sought to progress their own claim 
separately. There were attempts at mediation, but eventually the then 
Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, Doug Graham decided 
to accept the mandate of TAIA to negotiate on behalf of the Te Atiawa 
aggregation. To this effect, he wrote a letter to the TAIA stating the conditions 
on which the mandate was accepted:97 
In accepting the mandate the Crown notes that there are unresolved issues between the 
lwi Authority, Puketapu hapu and potentially Otaraua hapu. The Crown's acceptance 
would be provided on the basis that the lwi Authority continues to ensure that: 
• provisions for Puketapu hapu representation and other hapu groups remain in 
place 
Te Atiawa lwi Authority remains committed to keeping Puketapu hapu and 
other hapu groups informed of the progress of negotiations, and 
• the five hapu continue to suppo1t Te Atiawa lwi Authority (particularly Otaraua 
hapu). 
The Puketapu Hapu was unhappy with this outcome and in late 1997 
submitted its own deed of mandate, which was rejected by the Minister.98 The 
position, then, was that the T AIA was negotiating a comprehensive settlement 
for all claims in the Te Atiawa rohe, including those of Puketapu, despite 
Puketapu not accepting the mandate of T AIA to do so. Puketapu 
unsuccessfully challenged this in Court, seeking a prohibitory injunction on 
the grounds that "it was for the Puketapu hapu to decide whether or not to 
negotiate with the Crown and, if so, how, and that it had its own deed of 
mandate for its representation and did not recognise T AIA' s ability to 
97 Hon Doug Graham, letter to the interim chairperson of Te Atiawa lwi Authority Incorporated, reproduced 
in Kai Tahu Tahu O Puketapu Hapu Jnc v Attorney-Genera/ & Te Atiawa Jwi Authority, above, 8-9 . 
98 Kai Tahu Tahu O Puketapu Hapu Inc v Attorney-Genera/ & Te Atiawa fwi Authority, above, 9. 
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represent it".99 Despite this challenge, negotiations continued, and the 
settlement is currently at the heads of agreement stage. 100 
2 NgaiTahu 
In the South Island, a similar situation occurred when the Waitaha grouping 
challenged the ability of Ngai Tahu to enter into a settlement of its Treaty 
claims. 101 Interestingly, Ngai Tahu was supported by the Attorney-General 
on behalf of the Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations in 
defending this challenge. 
Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu was established by Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu Act 
1996 to provide a body corporate with which the Crown could conduct 
settlement negotiations. Section 15(1) of this Act provided that "the body 
shall be recognised for all purposes as the representative of Ngai Tahu 
Whanui". 
The Waitaha group, not included in the definition of the Ngai Tahu Whanui 
111 section 2 of the Act, 102 filed a claim with the Waitangi Tribunal for 
consideration of their historical grievances.103 While this was pending, a deed 
99 Kai Tahu Tahu O Puketapu Hapu Inc v Attorney-Genera/ & Te Atiawa lwi Authority, above, 9. 
100 The heads of agreement can be viewed at http://www.executive.govt.n1196-
99/111in iste1h.rnha111/te at iawa/ i11 clex .html (Last Accessed 10 August 2003). 
101 Waitaha Taiwhenua o Waitaki Trust & Ors v Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu & Attorney-Genera/ ( I 7 June 
1998) High Cou1t Christchurch CP4 l /98 Panckhurst J. An interesting description of the background to 
this dispute can be found in Andrew Sharp "Recent Juridical and Constitutional Histories of Maori" in 
Andrew Sharp and Paul McHugh (eds) Histories: Power and l oss (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 
200 I) 48-56. 
102 A supplementary order paper to the Bill sought to add Waitaha to the definition ofNgai Tahu whanui 
in clause 2 of the Bill , although this was withdrawn by the Hon Doug Kidd, who proposed it, after 
significant debate in the House - (20 March 1996) 553 NZPD 11580. Of significant interest from this 
debate is the statement made on the behalf of Waitaha during select committee proceedings referred to by 
the Hon Mrs T W M Tirikatene-Sullivan that "we of the iwi , hapu, and whanau of Waitaha have not, do 
not, and will not recognise any other iwi as having the reo, the mana, the tapu, the ihi , the wehi for 
Waitaha in all matters to do with our whakapapa, our waiata, our purakau, our patere, our karakia, our 
whanau, our hapu, and our iwi ." - (20 March 1996) 553 NZPD I 1579. 
103 These were cl aims Wai 618 and Wai 622. 
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of settlement was signed between Ngai Tahu and the Crown. The relevant 
provisions of the deed were summarised by Panckhurst J as follows: 104 
[c]Jause 17.3. I I contemplates amendment of the definition of "Ngai Tahu Whanui" 
in s2 of the 1996 Act to include a reference to "Waitaha". Clause 1.2. I contains an 
extensive definition of "Ngai Tahu claims" and, relevantly for present purposes, 
includes [Waitaha's Tribunal claims] therein. The intent was for the Waitaha people 
to be recognised as included in Ngai Tahu Whanui and their unresolved claims to be 
subsumed as part of the greater Ngai Tahu settlement. By clause 17 .3 the Crown 
agreed within six months to introduce legislation to give effect to the settlement. 
Thus, the interests of Waitaha were included in the Ngai Tahu settlement, 
despite Waitaha's refusal to accept Ngai Tahu's mandate to negotiate on their 
behalf. Despite a challenge in the High Court, the provisions in the deed of 
settlement were passed into legislation, and Waitaha are now unable to pursue 
their claims through either the Courts or the Waitangi Tribunal. 105 
3 Ngati Ruanui 
More recently, in the course of the Ngati Ruanui settlement, issues arose 
over the Crown's decision to accept the mandate of the N gati Ruanui M uru 
me te Raupatu Working Party to settle all the historical claims of Ngati 
Ruanui. Two hapu which would have had their claims subsumed by any such 
settlement, Pakakohi and Tangahoe, argued that the working party did not 
possess such a mandate, and that they should have the opportunity to 
negotiate for the settlement of their claims independently. 106 
104 Wai/aha Tahvhenua o Waitaki Trust & Ors v Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu & Attorney-General (17 June 
1998) High Court Christchurch CP4 l/98 Panckhurst J, 3-4. 
105 See Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998, s9; Sandra Lee, the then deputy leader of the opposition 
Alliance pa11y noted in Parliament during the third reading of the Act that other groups - including Ngati 
Apa, Ngati Rangitane, Ngati Rarua and Ngati Mamoe also had their rights prejudiced by the passage of the 
Act - (29 September I 998) 572 NZPD 12376. 
106 See the covering Jetter to the Waitangi Tribunal 's Pakakohi and Tangahoe Settlement Claims Report: 
Wai 758 (Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2000). 
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Pakakohi and Tangahoe obtained an urgent hearing in the Waitangi 
Tribunal, which considered the matter and concluded that the claims of 
Tangahoe were not distinct from those of Ngati Ruanui as a whole, but that 
Pakakohi's claims were. However, the Tribunal found that there was not 
sufficient evidence of support for a separate settlement so as to warrant the 
Tribunal taking a hard look at the Crown's handling of the process. 107 The 
settlement process went ahead despite a subsequent High Court challenge. 108 
4 Other Settlements 
These three settlements are the most visible examples of where smaller 
groupings have seen their claims subsumed within a larger grouping against 
their will. However, this is almost certainly a more widespread occurrence. 
In every claims district there exists an actual or potential risk of many 
hapu simply acquiescing to the policy out of fear they will be excluded from 
the settlement process if they do not. When some hapu expressed concern 
about their role in the Ngati Tuwharetoa settlement process, the Office of 
Treaty Settlements responded with a letter outlining their policy and stating 
that: 109 
if a minority of hapu choose to stand outside of. .. negotiations that would not be 
sufficient cause for the Crown not to begin negotiations .. . I should emphasise that -
consistent with the policy of comprehensive settlement with large natural groups -
the Crown would not contemplate having separate negotiations with individual 
hapu. 
107 Waitangi Tribunal The Pakakohi and Tangahoe Settlement Claims Report: Wai 758 (Wellington, 
2000), 66; proceedings were brought following the production of this report alleging bias on the behalfof 
Chief Judge Joe Williams, who presided at the hearing, however these proceedings failed as the Court 
concluded there was no such bias - see Hayes & Ors v Waitangi Tribunal & Ors (I O May 200 I) High 
Court Wellington CPI 11 /01 Goddard J. 
108 Watene & Ors v Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Settlements (11 May 2001) High Court 
Wellington CPl20/01 Goddard J. 
109 Letter from Tony Sole, Manager Claim Development, Office of Treaty Settlements to Rawinia Konui 
(18 August 2003). 
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Thus the prospect of exclusion, and having a settlement proceed without 
them, is brought home to wavering hapu by the Office of Treaty Settlements. 
Given this, it is unsurprising that some claimants feel that they have been 
forced, against their will , to amalgamate into "Large Natural Groupings" for 
fear they will miss out on a piece of the settlement if they do not. This can be 
seen in a submission to the Waitangi Tribunal from the Mokai Patea Waitangi 
Claims Committee, a body established by a number of hapu in the Whanganui 
area, where the claimants lament that they have had "no choice but to ... enter 
this foreign process to protect our interests".' 10 
E Fast-Tracking Claims 
The potential for further problems with this policy can be seen in the 
current process for the settlement of Central North Island claims, which cover 
a third of Maoridom. Here, in an effort to secure a speedy settlement, the 
Government is proposing that a 'fast-track' system be used. A similar process 
is also proposed for the Volcanic Interior Plateau and Whanganui claim 
areas. 111 
In a letter from the Office of Treaty Settlements, claimants are informed 
that the Hon Margaret Wilson, the Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi 
Negotiations has indicated "the importance of maintaining momentmn". 112 
This desire to expedite the process is also demonstrated by the Crown's 
actions, including bringing in former Finance Minister David Caygill in an 
eff01i to facilitate communication between the parties.' 13 
11 0 
See " Submission from the Mokai Patea Waitangi Claims Committee Concerning the Inquiry 
Boundary" (2 November 2002) Wai 903 Doc #2.57 . 
111 " Memorandum and directions of Judge CM Wainwright re: Judicial Conference for 
Whanganui District Inquiry" Wai 903 Doc #2.88, 2. 
112 Letter from Ross Phillipson, Central North Island Project Leader, Office of Treaty Settlements to 
Interim Representatives of Claimant Groups (16 June 2003) Wai 950 Doc #2. I 133(b), Wai 951 Doc 
#2. 1039(a), Wai 952 Doc #2. 1022(a). 
113 
Eugene Bingham, Phil Taylor And Catherine Masters "Government Gambles on High Risk Treaty 
Plan" ( 19 July 2003) The New Zealand Herald Auckland I. 
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The process sets down a two year timeframe for settlement which would 
bring fruits for the Government directly before the 2005 election. However, in 
the hurry to settle claims quickly, whatever the motive is, there is a risk that 
those smaller groups which are unable to negotiate with the Crown directly 
will be left behind. 
1 Further compromise on hapu interests? 
The Office of Treaty Settlements, in a letter to the interim representatives 
of claimant groups in the Central North Island, stated that "it is important that 
the interests of individual hapu and whanau are represented around the 
table". 114 The letter went on to say that the Office expects that claimant 
groups have "good processes and structures to enable this to occur". However, 
crucially, the letter stated "at the same time, we are conscious that whanau and 
hapu issues should not distract from progressing settlements at the wider 
level." 115 
This appears to be a clear indication that the Crown are willing to accept 
whanau and hapu interests being compromised in the quest for a 
comprehensive settlement. 
2 Research 
Smaller groups are further kneecapped by a lack of access to research 
funding. As Alan Ward, who has worked as a contract historian for the 
Waitangi Tribunal points out, claims tend to be "hydra-headed", as research at 
114 Letter from Ross Phillipson, Central North Island Project Leader, Office of Treaty Settlements to 
Interim Representatives of claimant groups ( I 6 June 2003) Wai 950 Doc #2.1 I 33(b), Wai 951 Doc 
#2.1039(a), Wai 952 Doc #2.1022(a). 
115 Letter from Ross Phillipson, Central North Island Project Leader, Office of Treaty Settlements to 
Interim Representatives of claimant groups ( 16 June 2003) Wai 950 Doc #2. l I 33(b), Wai 95 I Doc 
#2.1039(a), Wai 952 Doc #2.1022(a). 
iwi level prompts further claims at the hapu, and occasionally whanau level as 
the smaller groups begin to "discern, and to assert" their interests.' 16 
Despite the importance of such research, in furtherance of the plan to 
expedite the Central North Island claim, research is to be conducted initially 
along general lines, with "overview research covering all the generic issues". 117 
The aim is to provide "a sufficient evidential base either for hearings and a 
Tribunal report on the claim issues affecting all or most of the claimants in a 
district, or for the negotiation of a settlement of these issues" . 118 
The same process has been proposed for the Rotorua inquiry district. 119 In 
the proposal for this district, it is explicitly noted that the research would 
necessarily be based on "big picture" issues and devoid of specific claims, 
"such as a detailed hapu/whanau grievance about a [particular resource]". 120 
The problem then, is that if generic research is carried out into the big 
picture issues it will not explicitly examine the particular claims of hapu and 
whanau. This is particularly problematic as it is carried out with the goal of 
fast tracking a comprehensive settlement which will result in legislation 
extinguishing the rights of these smaller groups to pursue a clain1 at a later 
date. 
These problems were noted by Jolene Patuawa, counsel for Ngati 
Tamakari, one of the hapu in the Central North Island claim district, in a 
11 6 Alan Ward An Unsettled History - Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today (Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington, 1999) 176. 
117 See Waitangi Tribunal Research Co-Ordinating Committee "Central North Island Inquiry : Stage One 
Casebook - proposal for an integrated research programme" (June 2003) Wai 950 Doc #2.1 130, Wai 951 
Doc #2.1035 , Wai 952 Doc #2.1019, I. 
118 Waitangi Tribunal Research Co-Ordinating Committee "Central North Island Inquiry : Stage One 
Csaebook Proposal" above, I (emphasis added) . 
119 See Dr Barry Rigby, Eileen Barrett-Whitehead, Bruce Stirling, Dr Grant Phillipson "Rotorua Inquiry 
District: Stage One Casebook Discussion Paper" (May 2003) Wai 950 Doc #2.1129, 2. 
120 Rigby, Barrett-Whitehead, Stirling and Phillipson "Rotorua Inquiry District: Stage One Casebook 
Discussion Paper", above, 2. 
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memorandW11 to the Waitangi TribW1al. In her memorandW11, it was stated 
that: 121 
[i]t is a concern that the first stage overview research would be of little benefit to 
hapu claims like Ngati Tamakari ... It is a concern of Ngati Tamakari that if generic 
research is commissioned and claims are settled on that research, the interests of 
Ngati Tamakari may be compromised from the lack of research into their specific 
claims . 
A joint memorandW11 from coW1sel for Ngai te Rangi and Ngai Tukairangi 
argued that independently commissioned research was necessary as " in the 
absence of such ... evidence, the fear that [the claimants] have is that their 
evidence will be submerged, glossed over or given little emphasis when 
considered alongside that of other competing claimants." 122 
Funding for such independently commissioned research is scarce. One of 
the main potential sources of such funding, the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, 
recently stated that it would make funding available for claimant research 
subject to criteria which would rule out virtually all hapu and whanau groups. 
These criteria require that those seeking funding possess " the organisational 
characteristics necessary to negotiate a settlement by 31 March 2006" and a 
"detailed business case, which satisfactorily addresses [Crown Forestry 
Rental] Trust requirements for claimant evidential base, claimant definition, 
mandate and a settlement model" .123 
Thus, funding for research is put out of the reach of smaller claimants who 
would almost without exception be unable to fulfil the Trust ' s requirements. 
As generic research will , by the researchers own admission, be unable to focus 
12 1 " Memorandum of Counsel for Ngati Tamakari Regarding Memoranda dated 25 March 2003" ( 16 April 
2003). 
122 "Joint Memorandum of Counsel for Ngai te Rangi and Ngai Tukairangi following Judicial Conference 
at Rotorua on 26 March 2003" Wai 950 Doc #2.1 IOI (a). 
123 Gary Judd QC "Counsel for Crown Forestry Rental Trust memorandum to Tribunal for 27 March 2003 
conference" Wai 950 (Wai 791), 2. 
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on specific claims, the smaller groups will simply not be able to prove the 
extent of their grievance, or due to the factors Alan Ward notes, even know 
that such a grievance exists. 124 
Michel Foucault ' s equation between savoir (knowledge) and pouvoir 
(power) is highly relevant here. 125 Larger Groups are able to obtain extensive 
research, and therefore gain detailed knowledge about their claims, giving them 
the power to negotiate and settle their claims with the Crown, whereas smaller 
groups are often unable to conduct sufficient research to even prove a 
grievance may possibly exist. 126 
If the process is sped up in the way proposed, these smaller groups will 
be still further disadvantaged, excluding their grievances from the settlement 
process, and potentially resulting in more injustice. 127 
VI ROLE OF THE COURTS 
Given that these settlements purport to abrogate for all time the rights of 
groups to bring a claim for historical Treaty grievances, this would appear to 
be an area which the Courts should be jealously watching. However, what has 
occurred in practice reveals quite the opposite result. 
124 Alan Ward An Unsettled Histo,y - Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today (Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington , I 999) 176; see also Peter Shand "Fixing Settlement: An analysis of government policy for 
settling Tiriti grievances" (I 998) 8 AULR 739, 760. 
125 Peter Shand points this out in relation to the disparity between the Crown and Claimants generally - see 
Shand, above, 760; Michel Foucault L 'Archelogie du Savi or (Panthenon, New York, 1972) and Miche l 
Foucault L 'Ordre du Discours (Panthenon, New York, 1971 ). 
126 Wayne Rumbles of Waikato University takes this further in "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Process: 
New Relationship or New Mask" (Paper Presented at "Compr(om)ising Post Colonisation Conference, 
Woolongong, I 0-13 February 1999), arguing "[t]hat the New Zealand state is able to construct the past and 
therefore is able to control the present is evident in the case of Treaty settlements; by having the power to 
accept the existence and the extent of Treaty breaches, the Crown can determine to large degree the outcome 
of the settlements." 
127 Note the conclusions of the Waitangi Tribunal in the Pakakohi and Tangahoe Settlement Claims 
Report: Wai 758 (Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2000) 66. Here it is noted that there was a need for any 
deed of settlement in the Ngati Ruanui claim to reflect the traditions and identity of the smaller grouping 
lest they be "written out ofTaranaki history." And "[t]hat, were it to happen, would create a fresh grievance 
out of the settlement of an old one." 
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A General approach of the Courts 
As more settlements are conducted, more cases challenging them are 
making it to Court. 128 In several instances, constituent hapu have refused to 
recognise the authority of iwi claiming to speak on their behalf in settlement 
negotiations. 
For the most part, these cases have struck a jurisdictional brick wall. In the 
High Court, judges have held that the direct settlement process is "not by its 
nature amenable to supervision by the Courts". 129 The reason given by the 
Court for its lack of jurisdiction is that negotiations are "entertained by the 
Crown as part of a political and not part of a legal process" 130 and that Court 
intervention "would be an outright interference in what is nothing more or less 
than an ongoing political process as opposed to a distinct matter oflaw" 131 . 
Furthermore, it has been held that if these negotiations lead to a settlement, 
that settlement would also be non-justiciable until it passes into legislation. 132 
At this stage, as a matter of elementary constitutional principle, the decisions 
will be "inviolate and totally beyond the reach of the Court's supervision". 133 
The Court of Appeal recently examined the subject and upheld this line of 
reasoning. Gault P concluded: 134 
128 See Kai Tahu Tahu o Puketapu Hapu Inc v Attorney-Genera/ and Te Atiawa fwi Authority (5 February 
1999) High Court Wellington CP344/97 Doogue J; Pouwhare and Or v Allorney-Genera/ and Te 
Runanga O Ngati Awa (30 August 2002) High Court Wellington CP78/02 Goddard J; Rukutai Watene 
and Ors v Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations (11 May 2001) High Court Wellington 
CP 120/0 I Goddard J. 
129 Pouwhare and Or v Allorney-General and Te Runanga o Ngati Awa above, para 42 ; note that this 
approach has a concerning resonance with the comments of Prendergast CJ in Wi Parata v Bishop of 
Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72 (SC) that the extinguishment of native title was an "act of state" 
and therefore beyond the reach of the courts. 
13° Kai Tahu Tahu O Puketapu Hapu Inc v Allorney-General and Te Atiawa !wi Authority above1 15. 
Il l Greensi/1 & Ors v Tainui Maori Trust Board (17 May 1995) High Court Hamilton Ml 17/95, 12-13 
Hammond J. 
132 Pouwhare and Or v Attorney-General and Te Runanga o Ngati Awa above, para 45. 
133 Pouwhare and Or v Attorney-General and Te Runanga o Ngati Awa above, para 45. 
134 Milroy and Ors v Allorney-General and Te Runanga o Ngali Awa (11 June 2003) CA 197/02, Gault P, 
para 18. 
[t]he importance of the process for addressing claims in respect of breaches of the 
Treaty is fully recognised. Where that involves the exercise by the Executive of 
statutory or prerogative powers, lawfulness can be challenged on established grounds 
for judicial review. But where the action challenged does not itself affect the rights 
of any persons and is undertaken in the course of policy formulation preparatory to 
the introduction to Parliament of legislation, the courts will not intervene. 
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As the direct settlement process has no statutory basis, the result is that 
(generally speaking) the Courts will not look at the Treaty settlement process 
at all, instead holding it to be non-justiciable. 
B Statutory Trusts 
However, one case where the door was not entirely shut was Waitaha 
Taiwhenua o Waitaki Trust & Anor v Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu and Attorney-
General. 135 
The claimants filed an application for review, arguing that Te Runanga o 
Ngai Tahu did not have the authority to negotiate on behalf of Waitaha, nor 
did they "have authority to purport to even conditionally settle Waitaha 
claims". 136 The defendants argued that the cause of action should be struck 
out, as these issues were not justiciable. 137 
This case is interesting, as the Court refused to strike out the claims 
immediately. Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to distinguish the earlier cases 
which had foundered. They argued that as the negotiating body was a 
statutory trust with defined powers, it was qualitatively different from the 
135 Wait aha Taiwhenua o Waitaki Trust & Or v Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu and Attorney-Genera/ ( 17 June 
1998) High Cowt Christchurch CP 41 /98 Panckhurst J. 
136 Waitaha Taiwhenua o Waitaki Trust & Or v Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu and Attorney-Genera/, above, 
5. 
137 Waitaha Taiwhenua o Waitaki Trust & Or v Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu and Attorney-Genera/, above, 
6. 
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negotiating bodies in the earlier cases. 138 Panckhurst J noted that he broadly 
accepted the thrust of the plaintiffs arguments, and consequently refused to 
strike out the proceedings. 
The Court noted, in what Chery 1 Simes called "perhaps an excess of legal 
positivism" 139 that if the settlement legislation was passed further review of 
the ability of Ngai Tahu to settle on behalf of Waitaha would be impossible: 140 
if the Bill was passed relevantly unamended for present purposes I consider that 
Parliament would have spoken and the Court ' s intervention would be wrong in 
principle. In that regard I accept the submission of Mr Andrew, for the second 
defendant, that for the Court to intervene to restrain approval of the statute "would 
be to sit in judgment on Parliament and to conclude that it had acted in error. 
The Bill did proceed "relevantly unan1ended", and the Waitaha hapu were 
included in the settlement legislation. 141 The case, therefore, never made it to a 
substantive hearing. 
As such, the Courts' position is that they will generally not intervene, 
save perhaps in the situation where the body conducting negotiations is a 
statutory body with limited and defined powers. In any event, if legislation is 
passed (as it invariably is) to give effect to a settlement, the Courts will hold 
that to be sacrosanct. 
138 Waitaha Taiwhenua o Waitaki Trust & Or v Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu and Al!orney-General, above, 
9-10. 
139 Cheryl Y Simes "Deciding who should represent Maori" [2002] NZLJ I 00, IOI. 
140 Waitaha Taiwhenua o Waitaki Trust & Or v Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu and Attorney-General, above 
II . 
141 See Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998, s 9. 
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C Waitangi Tribunal 
The approach of the Waitangi Tribunal has been essentially the same as 
the Courts. While it has stated that that it does have jurisdiction to consider 
whether any particular decision on settlements is a breach of the Treaty, it has 
also stated that it considers that there is an "air of artificiality" about such 
claims, due to the focus of the Tribunal on Crown actions. 142 This is because, 
the Tribunal argues, while the claims "are technically aimed at the Crown, they 
mask what is essentially an internal dispute between closely related kin groups 
as to which organisation at which level speaks for them". 143 
Furthermore, the Tribunal has adopted the reasoning of the Courts, holding 
that: 144 
there are a number of important considerations which militate against the Tribunal 
interfering ... except in clear cases of error in process, misapplication of tikanga 
Maori, or apparent irrationality. These considerations include the political nature of 
the decision making under challenge, the artificiality of treating internal disputes as 
if they were disputes against the Crown, and the inherent difficulty of the subject 
matter. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the approach of both the Courts' and the 
Waitangi Tribunal is that, as Waitangi Tribunal member and Maori Land Court 
Judge Carrie Wainwright noted, "[i]t is very hard indeed to persuade any 
forum to call a halt to the process of effecting a settlement in order that the 
misgivings of the few can be addressed in the face of the apparent desire to 
proceed of the many, and of the Crown". 145 
142 Waitangi Tribunal Pakakohi and Tangahoe Settlement Claims Report: Wai 758 (Legislation Direct, 
Wellington, 2000), 55-56. 
143 Waitangi Tribunal Pakakohi and Tangahoe Settlement Claims Report, above, 55; the inappropriateness 
of the Waitangi Tribunal as a forum for such grievances was noted over ten years ago by Chief Judge 
Edward Durie (as he then was) at the New Zealand Law Conference - see Edward Durie "Politics and 
Treaty Law" (Lecture to New Zealand Law Conference, Wellington, 2-5 March 1993). 
144 Waitangi Tribunal The Pakakohi and Tangahoe Settlement Claims Report above, 57 . 
145 Carrie Wainwright "Maori representation issues and the Cou11s" in David Carter and Matthew Palmer 
(eds) Roles and Perspectives in the Law: Essays in Honour of Sir lvor Richardson (Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 2002), 191. 
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D Should, or Could, the Courts Be More Involved? 
1 The Arguments 
Judge Wainwright notes that these challenges to prev10us settlements 
raised "matters of substance ... that needed unraveling" but which were not 
addressed, as the courts "possibly lacked the will, but certainly lacked the 
means, to help". 146 Her honour goes on to argue that litigation is not the best 
means by which to resolve these issues as any attempt to fit these kinds of 
disputes into "legal boxes" (if this is indeed possible) will obscure the real 
issues, and sour relationships. 147 
While this may be the case, there is an argument to be made that the 
Courts should be more concerned with ensuring the fairness of the process. 
Chief Judge Durie (as he then was) at the 1993 New Zealand Law Conference 
made an observation that is still of significance today: 148 
the just resolution of Maori claims that are fair and reasonable, not only between the 
partners but amongst Maori themselves, presents the greatest challenge to the claims 
process. Despite some opinion that the settlement of claims is a political matter, the 
courts may need to have a continuing role in the search for a proper solution ... for 
the protection of the Crown as much as anyone else. 
Similarly, Sir Robin Cooke (as he then was), writing at around the same 
time, observed that what progress had occurred in the Treaty area was the 
result of: 149 
146 Wainwright, above, 191. 
147 Wainwright, above, 191 . 
148 Edward Durie " Politics and Treaty Law" (Lecture to New Zealand Law Conference, Wellington, 2-5 
March 1993). 
149 Rt Hon Sir Robin Cooke "The Challenge of Treaty of Waitangi Jurisprudence" (1994) 2 Waikato LR I. 
an interaction of three forces: first, some enlightened leadership on both the Crown 
and Maori sides; secondly, the inquiries and reports of the Waitangi Tribunal. .. 
thirdly, the traditional courts and in some of their judgments an increased 
willingness to take into account the Treaty and the fiduciary concept. The 
responsibility of judicial decision is quite different from that of Tribunal 
recommendation. The functions are complementary. All three forces are probably 
essential to further progress. 
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These arguments are forceful. As Sir Robin noted, the Treaty process is 
not solely political, and is one in which the Courts play an integral part. In 
addition to this, as Chief Judge Durie notes, for the process to achieve its aims 
it is necessary to ensure it is conducted fairly. If the political process is failing 
to provide this fairness , then the Courts must step in. 
Furthermore, as Treaty barrister and editor of the Maori Law Review Tom 
Bennion points out, large natural groupings which achieve settlements will 
form legal structures to manage them - each with rules about membership, 
decision-making and distribution of benefits. 150 Bennion predicts that in some 
areas, unresolved issues around hapu and other small groups will come 
bubbling back up after settlement in the form of applications for judicial 
review of their actions, and litigation concerning the interpretation of any 
rules. 151 It would make sense, then, for the Courts to resolve disputes before 
this occurs, rather than functioning as an ambulance at the bottom of the cliff. 
However, Judge Wainwright notes that even if Courts have the will to 
intervene, they lack the jurisdiction to do so. 152 Largely this is deliberate on 
the behalf of the Government. As Professor Mason Durie points out, one of 
150 Interview with Tom Bennion (the author, Wellington, 12 September 2003). 
151 Interview with Tom Bennion (the author, Wellington, 12 September 2003). 
152 Carrie Wainwright "Maori representation issues and the Courts" in David Carter and Matthew Palmer 
(eds) Roles and Perspectives in the Law: Essays in Honour of Sir lvor Richardson (Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 2002) 191 . 
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the key motives behind the direct settlement process was a desire that the 
Government and not the courts would have the final say on Treaty issues. 153 
How, then, can the Courts fulfil the role that Chief Judge Durie and Sir 
Robin Cooke saw as fundamental to the durability of any settlements? 
2 Mediation Provisions 
One prospect is to utilise the Maori Land Court. This is not a novel 
concept, and current Chief Maori Land Court Judge Joe Williams has seen a 
role for the Court in resolving disputes over such representation issues. 154 The 
Court currently has jurisdiction contained in the mediation provision found in 
section 30 of the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, which provides: 
30. Maori Land Court's jurisdiction to advise on or determine 
representation of Maori group 
( 1) The Maori Land Court may do either of the following things: 
(a) advise other courts, commissions, or tribunals as to who are the most 
appropriate representatives of a class or group of Maori: 
(b) determine, by order, who are the most appropriate representatives of a class 
or group of Maori. 
(2) The jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court in subsection ( 1) applies to 
representation of a class or group of Maori in or for the purpose of (current or 
intended) proceedings, negotiations, consultations, allocations of property, or 
other matters. 
(3) A request for advice or an application for an order under subsection (1) is an 
application within the ordinary jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court, and the 
Maori Land Court has the power and authority to give advice and make 
determinations as the Cowi thinks proper. 
153 Mason Durie Te mana, te kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self determination (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1998) 188. 
154 Chief Judge Joe Williams "The Maori Land Court- A Separate Legal System?" Victoria University 
Centre for Public law Occasional Paper No 4, (Wellington, 2001), 10-11. 
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The prospect of this provision being used in the settlement context was 
raised as long ago as 1994. 155 More recently, it has been noted that this 
provision, as amended in 2002, 156 would have allowed the Maori Land Court 
to have determined by order who were the most appropriate representatives 
of each of the objecting groups in the above cases, and as such, "whether the 
group should, for the purposes of negotiation, be involuntarily subsumed into 
the larger class". 157 
Such groups could now apply to the Chief Judge of the Maori Land Court 
m writing under section 30C of the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act for a 
determination. However, whether the Chief Judge chooses to act upon this 
request is largely at his or her discretion. 158 There is no requirement that every 
application under section 30 receives consideration, let alone a hearing, and the 
application may be dismissed if it is vexatious, frivolous or an abuse of the 
Maori Land Court, fails to satisfy rules of court, does not present serious 
issues for determination or, crucially "if the Judge considers it appropriate to 
dismiss or defer consideration of the application for any other reason".159 
This provides what Symes calls an "extraordinarily subjective 
discretion" 160 which could pose problems to claimants, especially in light of 
155 See Tom Bennion " Who Represents Maori Groups?" (November 1994) Maori LR I ; note that the 
possibility of using the mediation provisions in the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act to deal with mandate 
issues was considered by Cabinet during the initial development of the settlement proposals, but appears to 
have gone no futther - see Hon John Luxton, Minister of Maori Affairs "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement 
Fund: Claimant Representation" (9 March 1994) CSC (94) 15 , Officials Strategy Committee "Treaty of 
Waitangi Settlement Fund : Size, Shape, Timescale and the Reciprocation from Maori" (28 June 1993) 
csc (93) 90 . 
156 Te Ture Whenua Maori Amendment Act 2002 / Maori Land Amendment Act 2002. 
157 Cheryl Y Simes "Deciding who shou ld represent Maori" [2002] NZLJ I 00, IOI ; see also the comments 
of the Waitangi Tribuna l in the Pakakohi and Tangahoe Settlement Claims Report: Wai 758 (Legislation 
Direct, Wellington, 2000) at 56-57; however, note the concerns as to the efficacy of such determinations -
see Carrie Wainwright " Maori representation issues and the Courts" in David Carter and Matthew Palmer 
(eds) Roles and Perspectives in the l aw: Essays in Honour of Sir lvor Richardson (Victoria University 
Press , Wellington, 2002), 192-194; And the concerns of the Maori Land Court in Re Ngati Paoa Whanau 
Trust ( 1995) 96A Hauraki MB 155 which were raised in New Zealand Law Commission Determining 
Representation Rights Under Te Ture Whenua Maori Act / 993 (NZLC SP8, Wellington, 2001 ) 12 . 
158 
See Symes, above, IOI. 
159 Te Ture Whenua Maori Act, s 30C(6); Symes, above, I O 1. 
160 Symes, above IOI. 
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the fact that judges in other Courts have been extremely reticent to enqmre 
into what they view as policy decisions. 
As well as these legal difficulties, even if the Court holds that the larger 
grouping is not the appropriate representative for the smaller group, there is 
nothing to stop the Government from deciding as a matter of policy that it will 
ignore the decision and proceed to settle with the larger group. 161 This point 
was noted by the Maori Land Court when it was asked to intervene in the 
dispute as to distribution of fisheries assets. 162 Deputy Chief Judge McHugh 
stated: 163 
[t]he determination made by the Maori Land Court following an inquiry under 
section 30( I )(b) may be ... accepted as conclusive by the Chief Judge but there the 
matter rests. The determination is not binding on any other party. It is ce1tainly not 
a determination that has any binding effect beyond the Chief Executive or Chief 
Judge although those respective persons may convey the determination by way of 
advice to third parties. 
Overall, Section 30 provides one mechanism by which a Court could 
examine the issue of who the appropriate representative of a hapu is for the 
purpose of settlement negotiations, and therefore, whether the policy itself is 
appropriate for any given claimant group. However, given the limitations of 
the provision, it is not a particularly potent weapon in the armoury of smaller 
groups. It should also be noted that smaller groups will be ineligible for legal 
aid, and will be required to fund any such Maori Land Court action 
themselves. 164 
161 Symes, above, IOI. 
162 Cracknell v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (1993) Tairawhiti MB 152; noted in New 
Zealand Law Commission Determining Representation Rights Under Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 
(NZLC SP8, Wellington, 2001) 12. 
163 Cracknell v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, above. 
164 See Rapai Amber Te Hau v Gisborne District Legal Aid Committee ( 19 October 2000) Legal Aid 
Review Authority LRA 136/2000, Legal Aid Review Authority, Judge Middleton. 
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E Conclusions 
The cumulative effect of the Large Natural Grouping policy, the measures 
taken to ensure finality of settlements and the Courts inability (and reticence) 
to become involved is grave. Smaller groups are shut out of the process 
altogether, unless they acquiesce to the will of a larger grouping. Such an 
approach is severely prejudicial to the smaller group's rights, as settlement 
legislation invariably ensures the finality of the settlements by removing the 
ability of the courts and Waitangi Tribunal to re-open the historical claims. 165 
VII WILL SETTLEMENTS STAND UP? 
The flaws in the current policy raise two concerns. First: are the 
deficiencies likely to mean that any settlements reached will not stand up? 
And secondly: is this process in and of itself a breach of the Treaty? To find a 
discomforting answer to the first question, one only has to look to past 
attempts at settlements. 
A Lessons from the Past 
Attempts at settling historical grievances have occurred periodically 
throughout New Zealand history, most notably during the 1930s and 40s. 166 
At this time, the Sim Commission 167 made a number of recommendations to 
the Government relating to the settlement or grievances emerging from the 
raupatu (land confiscations) during what Belich called the "New Zealand 
wars" of the 1860s. 168 This led to an increased awareness of past wrongs 
which, combined with the influence of the Ratana movement in the Labour 
165 Office of Treaty Settlements Ka Tika a Muri, Ka Tika a Mua : Healing the Past, Building a Future 
(Wellington: 2002), 77. 
166 However, see also the South Island Landless Natives Act 1906 which intended to finally settle any 
sense of grievance in the South Island - and the comments of the Hon Jame3 Carrol about this at (1906) 
137 NZPD 318-320 - Barney Riley "Mocked before the ink is dry on the statute? Final Settlements of 
Treaty of Waitangi Claims" (LLB(Hons) Research Paper, Otago University, 1994) 29. 
167 A Royal Commission of Inquiry established by the Government in 1928. 
168 See Richard Hill Enthroning "Justice above Might "? The Sim Commission, Tainui and the Crown 
(Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit, Wellington, 1989); James Belich The New Zealand Wars and the 
Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (2 nd Ed, Penguin , Auckland, 1998). 
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government of the 1930s and the end of the great depression, led to a climate 
conducive to settlement negotiations. 169 
While the Second World War delayed these settlements, they occurred and 
were enshrined in legislation. As with the current process, finality was key. 
The Ngai Tahu Claim Settlement Act 1994 stated that it was an "Act to effect 
a Final Settlement of the Ngaitahu claim", 170 and even more explicitly that it 
was "in settlement of all claims and demands which have heretofore been 
made" and "which might hereafter be made". 171 
The failure of the 1944 Ngai Tahu "settlement" is most clearly obvious 
from the fact that just over fifty years later it was necessary to adopt 
legislation enshrining the terms of a new settlement negotiated to more 
properly address Ngai Tahu grievances. 172 
Interestingly in the Waitangi Tribunal hearing which preceded the 1998 
settlement, the Crown argued that Ngai Tahu were estopped by the 1944 
settlement from suggesting they were entitled to further compensation. 173 The 
Tribunal responded that "equity and justice required the Crown in good 
conscience to review the 1944 Act, who can say that the Crown might not be 
persuaded to do so again". 174 
Ngai Tahu is net the only example of where "final" settlements have been 
discarded and re-negotiated. The Ngai Tahu experience is almost identical to 
that of Taranaki , where the claimants "agreed to accept the provisions [ of the 
Taranaki Maori Claims Settlement Act 1944] . . . in full settlement and 
169 
See Riley , above, 29. 
170 See Long Title, Ngaitdhu Claim Settlement Act 1944. 
171 Ngaitahu Claim Settlement Act 1944, s2. 
172 See Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998. 
173 See Waitangi Tribunal Ngai Tahu Report Wai 27, (Brooker & Friend, Wellington , 1991), 1027. 
174 Waitangi Tribunal Ngai Tahu Report, above I 027 ; the Report refers to the Maori Purposes Amendment 
Act 1973 which revisited the terms of the 1944 sett lement. 
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discharge of the aforesaid claim". 175 Similar wording can be found in the 
Waikato-Maniapoto Maori Claims Settlement Act 1946, which purported to 
settle claims relating to land confiscations in the Waikato.176 The inadequacies 
of these settlements, too, can be seen in the fact that the claims have had to be 
renegotiated as they were found to be unfair, and incapable of being full, final 
settlements. 
A more recent example can be seen in the settlement of the historical 
grievances ofNgati Whatua at Orakei. While an initial settlement was made in 
1978, this had to be revisited in 1991 for much the same reasons at the 
settlements of the 1 940s. 177 
B Will History Repeat Itself? 
The lesson from this expenence is clear. If settlements are not handled 
properly, the result, no matter what those actually negotiating the settlement 
commit to, will not ultimately stand up. 
This was noted by Donna Awatere-Huata with respect to the Fisheries 
Settlement: 178 
[t]rom the outset, the four Maori Crown negotiators were appointed by the Crown. 
Now, when is it a partnership when one pai1ner decides who will negotiate on behalf 
of the other partner? If you steal my car, and then you appoint, against my wishes, 
my neighbour as my negotiating agent, if you two decide that you will buy me a 
175 Taranaki Maori Claims Settlement Act 1944, preamble - quoted in Barney Riley "Mocked before the 
ink is dry on the statute? Final Settlements of Treaty of Waitangi Claims" (LLB(Hons) Research Paper, 
Otago University, 1994) 30. 
176 An interesting narrative of the process leading up to this settlement, including the negotiations with 
then Prime Minister Peter Fraser, can be found in Michael King Te Puea (Sceptre, Auckland, 1987). 
177 See Orakei Block (Vesting and Use) Act 1978; Orakei Act 1991 ; Justine Munro "The Treaty of 
Waitangi and the Sea lord Deal" ( 1994) 24 VU WLR 389, 42 1-422. 
178 Donna Awatere-Huata, speech to the 1993 New Zealand Law Conference, quoted in Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation "Reconciliation and Social Justice Library" 
http :fiww\\ .austli i.edu .au/au/special/rs iproiectlrsi I ibrarv/car/kip7i 16.h tm I (Last accessed 21 July 2003), 
this comment is similar to one made by Josie Anderson, now a member of the Waitangi Tribunal, in Wira 
Gardiner Return to Sender - What really happened at the fis cal envelope hui (Reed, Auckland, 1996), 125. 
pushbike, you can hardly cry foul when I object to your procedures and to your full 
and final settlement. 
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The perception within the Government at present is clearly that these 
problems will not re-emerge. This is because, as Craig Coxhead of Waikato 
University notes, the Government believes that as Maori are participating and 
settling within the process as it currently stands, they have accepted the 
process. 179 This is a view which was shared by Dr Peter Shand, writing in the 
Auckland University Law Review in 1998. 18° Coxhead, however, goes on to 
argue that this is a false assumption, pointing to clear statements from 
claimant representatives that their entry into the negotiation process should 
not be taken to denote their acceptance of it. 181 He points out that Maori have 
"no alternative but to enter into negotiations if they are wanting to settle their 
Treaty claims". 182 
The comparison between the present process and that of the 1940s is thus 
inevitable. In both cases, the Crown have presented Maori with a process 
which is the "only deal in town" 183 with the expectation that the end result 
would be a definitive end to historical Treaty grievances. If the Government 
seriously intends achieving such an end result, however, it is necessary to learn 
from the lessons of the past, and ensure it is embarking on a well thought out 
program which is accepted by its Treaty partner. Lest it forget the words of 
179 Craig Cox head "Where are the Negotiations in the Direct Negotiations of Treaty Settlements?" (2002) 
I O Waikato LR 13, 30. 
180 Peter Shand "Fixing Settlement: An analysis of government policy for settling Tiriti grievances" ( 1998) 
8 AULR 739, 751, who states that "[t]hree years on ... categorical rejection has turned into general 
acceptance as many iwi and hapu have settled or are about to settle on terms dictated on terms dictated to 
them by the Government". 
181 Coxhead, above, 30. 
182 Coxhead, above, 30; see also "Submission from the Mokai Patea Waitangi Claims Committee 
Concerning the Inquiry Boundary" Wai 903 Doc #2.57, para 11 - "we also have no choice but to ... enter 
into this foreign process to protect our interests". 
183 This expression is borrowed from Professor Ranginui Walker who used it in the context of the 
"Sea lords Deal" in his inaugural lecture at Auckland University - Ranginui Walker "Tradition and Change 
in Maori Leadership" (Auckland University Research Unit for Maori Education, Monograph No 18, August 
1993), 19. 
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George Santayana: "[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it". 184 
The Crown can hardly feign shock at the possibility that the current 
settlements may not be either full or final. It was known as early as 1993, 
when the direct settlement proposals were still in development, that declaring 
a policy of negotiating solely with iwi would "be controversial for Maori" and 
that the issue of claimant representation "[ would] need to be resolved if the 
objectives of finality and durability are to be achieved". 185 And more 
specifically that if grievances were aggregated into a wider group there was a 
risk that "settlements... [ would not be seen] to extinguish highly specific 
grievances". 186 Furthermore, the topic has been broached in Parliament on 
numerous occasions. 187 The current Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi 
Negotiations herself said, shortly after taking office: 188 
[t]he Government will pay special attention to mandate and cross-claim issues and 
will work closely with individual claimants to ensure a robust process .. . [u]nlike the 
previous Government, this Government recognises that it needs to be flexible 
regarding these issues and that different approaches will be needed for different 
claimant groups. We will be working with claimants to this end. 
No matter how pressing the need for settlement with Maori, or for 
appeasement of the Pakeha public, any settlements reached under the current 
process may have been negotiated with the wrong parties, or omitted parties 
184 George Santayana The life of reason; or, The phases of human progress (Scribner, New York, 1954). 
185 Officials Strategy Committee "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Fund: Size, Shape, Timescale and the 
Reciprocation from Maori" (28 June 1993) CSC (93) 90, paras 74-76 
186 Officials ad hoe Committee "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Policies : Outstanding Issues" ( I O October 
1994) csc (94) 140, 3. 
187 See Sandra Lee (5 October 1999) 580 NZPD 19594; and Tariana Turia (17 September 1997) 563 NZPD 
4401-4402 where the Ngai Tahu (Pounamu Vesting) Bill was said to be "the creation by this Government 
of further grievances that successive Governments will be expected to resolve." 
188 Hon Margaret Wilson "Principles to guide settlement of Treaty claims" (3 August 2000) Press Release. 
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which should have been included. Consequently, they may be subject to re-
opening and re-negotiation in the future. 189 
VIII BREACH OF THE TREATY? 
Turning to the second question identified above, the potential for the 
settlement process in its current form to create new, further Treaty grievances 
is becoming apparent. This is a point which has been recognised by the Maori 
Affairs spokespeople from the current Labour Government's two major 
parliamentary allies, the Green 190 and United Future 191 parties. 
As the Waitangi Tribunal has expressly stated that it is "out of keeping 
with the spirit of the Treaty ... that the resolution of one injustice should be 
seen to create another", 192 such an outcome is concerning. This paper examines 
two possible breaches - one stemming from the Crown's unilateral decision to 
negotiate solely with "Large Natural Groupings" and a second, stemming from 
the Crown's actions in vesting control of assets in the hands of corporate iwi 
bodies rather than directly with hapu 
A Ignoring Hapu 
As the analysis above shows, academic opinion is clear on the point that 
hapu played the central role in Maori social organisation at the time of the 
signing of the Treaty. This is reflected in the text of the Treaty itself, which is 
unambiguous on who the Maori partner is - 'ki nga hapu - ki nga tangata 
katoa'. 193 As is frequently noted "the chiefs who signed the Treaty did so on a 
mandate from hapu and whanau, not iwi". 194 
189 
Whether settlements are unsound will , of course, require a closer examination of whether constituent 
hapu in each situation gave their willing, informed consent to larger-scale negotiations. 
190 
Metiria Turei (3 October 2002) 603 NZPD 885-887 
19 1 Murray Smith (6 November 2002) 603 NZPD 1664-1665. 
192 Waitangi Tribunal Waiheke Report : Wai JO (Brooker & Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1987) 99; see also 
Waitangi Tribunal Report on Muriwhenua Fishing Claim: Wai 22, (Waitangi Tribunal , Wellington 1988), 
xxi . 
193 
Janine Hayward '"The Crown' and ' Maori ': Problems of Group Identity and the Treaty of Waitangi" 
(Paper presented at NZPSA Conference 1996: The Democratic State: Individual and Communities), 17. 
194 
See Hayward , above, 12. 
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The Waitangi Tribunal has stated on a number of occas10ns that the 
traditional structure of social organisation is to be preserved under the 
Treaty. 195 As such, the traditional structures of social organisation should be 
protected by the Crown during the settlement process, otherwise the Crown 
cannot be said to be acting in accordance with the Treaty. Furthermore, the 
Tribunal repeatedly observed that "tribal restoration" is a key component of 
the settlement process. 196 
However, as detailed above, the effect of the large natural grouping policy 
has been to, in many cases, force hapu to either amalgamate with a larger group 
or risk having settlements negotiated without their input. Whether this 1s 
compatible with the obligation to protect traditional social structures 1s 
questionable. 
As Tariana Turia (then an opposition MP) noted during Parliamentary 
consideration of the Maori Affairs Committee's report on the Ngai Tahu 
(Ponamu Vesting) Bill , the process "pits ... hapu against their own whanaunga 
because the Crown prefers to deal with one legal iwi corporate structure 
instead of recognising the treaty rights of the hapu". 197 
This disruption is occurring during a time when, to quote one group of 
claimants in the Whanganui district, many groups are: 198 
195 See the discussion on this point by Justine Munro in "The Treaty of Waitangi and the Sealord deal" 
( 1994) 24 VUWLR 389, 393 , referring to the Waitangi Tribunal Mangonui Report: Wai 17 (Government 
Printer, Wellington , 1988) and Waitangi Tribunal Waiheke Report: Wai JO (Brooker & Friend Ltd , 
Wellington , 1987). 
196 See Waitangi Tribunal Turangi Township Remedies Report: Wai 84 (GP Publications, Wellington, 
1998), 2 .6.3 ; Waitangi Tribunal Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Orakei Claim: Wai 7 (Brooker & 
Friend Ltd , Wellington, 1987), 14.2; Waitangi Tribunal Waiheke Report : Wai 10 (Brooker & Friend Ltd, 
Wellington , 1987),41. 
197 Tariana Turia (17 September 1997) 563 NZPD 4401-4402 . 
198 " Submission from the Mokai Patea Waitangi Claims Committee concerning the inquiry boundary" Wai 
903 Doc 2 .57, para 5. 
involved in a process of re-establishing our historical and traditional social 
(political) structures which were destroyed during colonisation. This process will 
facilitate the long term development including the spiritual and economic 
advancement of our people. 
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The group notes that, notwithstanding the rebuilding process, after taking 
note of the mandate requirements of the claims process they have "had no 
choice but to form [a] claims committee consisting of representatives of the 
four hapu / iwi" and that they "also have no choice but to ... enter this foreign 
process to protect [their] interests" .199 
There is a strong argument that the large natural grouping policy is in direct 
conflict with the Crown's obligations under the Treaty, as it is undermining 
the process of rebuilding traditional social structures. As Sandra Lee put it 
during the first reading of the Ngati Turangitukua Claims Settlement Bill:200 
[f]or the Crown to insist determinedly that only iwi negotiators will be accepted at 
the door is, in itself, a grievance. It is generating conflict within hapu who belong to 
iwi who feel marginalised in terms of their own particular social structures and the 
responsibi I ities that attach to them in terms of their tikanga. 
Rather than assisting with the rebuilding of the traditional structures, the 
current process can instead be seen as fostering the growth of larger groups 
because they are easier for the Crown to deal with. 
An analogy can be drawn to the short lived Runanga Iwi Act 1990, the 
long title of which stated that it was to provide "for the registration by any 
iwi of a body corporate as the authorised voice of the Iwi".201 It was through 
199 "Submission from the Mokai Patea Waitangi Claims Committee concerning the inquiry boundary" Wai 
903 Doc 2.57, paras 11-12. 
200 Sandra Lee (5 October 1999) 580 NZPD 19593-19595. 
20 1 Runanga lwi Act 1990, long title . 
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these bodies that the Government was to devolve service provision functions 
from the old Department of Maori Affairs to iwi.202 
Annie Mikaere wrote of this Act at the time that it was a breach of the 
Article Two guarantee of tino rangatiratanga.203 Her argument was that 
rnnanga established under the Act must follow rnles set by the Government, 
otherwise their supply of funds would evaporate.204 The existence of such 
strict controls was said to be "anathema to tino rangatiratanga".205 This 
sentiment was echoed m submissions to the select committee which 
considered the Bill, with the added allegation that it breached the Treaty 
principle of equal partnership.206 Writing ten years later, Roger Maaka 
described the Act as "legislative social engineering".207 
In the Runanga Iwi Act the Government sought to strictly define the form 
of the bodies which it would deal with. The Government has not been so 
explicit in the current situation, but the similarities between the settlement 
process requirements and the Act are striking. While Healing the Past: 
Building a Future notes that "[i]t is for the claimant group to decide who will 
represent them and to determine an appropriate way to select their 
representatives",208 this statement must be read in light of the fact it is not 
open for claimants to organise in any way they wish. Indeed, the large natural 
grouping policy means it is not open for them to organise, as many hapu wish, 
202 See E M McLeay "Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back: Maori Devolution, Maori Advisory 
Committees and Maori Representation" (1991) 43 Political Science 30, 37; Interim Report of the Maori 
Affairs Committee on the Runanga lwi Bill [1990] AJHR I. I OA, 3-4. 
203 AL Mikaere "Maori Issues" [1990] NZ Recent Law Review 122. 
204 M ikaere, above. 
205 Mikaere, above; see also the repo11ing back of the Maori Affairs Committee on the Runanga lwi Act 
Repeal Bill, where the concern of submitters that "rights under the Treaty of Waitangi to govern 
themselves without interference from the Crown were totally ignored, and that the concept of partnership 
was undermined by the one-sided accountability" Joy McLauchlan (23 April 1991) 514 NZPD 1417-1419. 
206 Interim Repo11 of the Maori Affairs Committee on the Runanga Iwi Bill [ I 990] AJHR I. I OA, 5. 
201 Roger Maaka "A Relationship, Not a Problem" in Ken Coates and PG McHugh Kokiri ngatahi: living 
Relationships (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 203 . 
208 Office of Treaty Settlements Ka Tika a Muri, Ka Tika a Mua : Healing the Past, Building a Future 
(Wellington : 2002) 45; see also the comments of Doug Graham at ( 17 September 1998) 571 NZPD 12125 
- "Whilst those rights may be undeniably held by the whanau or the hapu of the time, it is the tribe's right 
to sit down and ask: '' Have we still got the right structure for us?" It is not for the Crown to get involved 
and start te lling them what the structure shou ld be." 
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along hapu lines in order to seek independent negot1at10ns. The Crown has 
firmly laid out that it will only negotiate at a particular level. The Crown, then, 
is simply engaging in a more subtle version of the Runanga Iwi Act policy, and 
the Treaty-based objections to it apply just as strongly. 
B Vesting 
Furthermore, by vesting assets in what may be the incorrect group, the 
Crown may be further compounding the Treaty breach caused by refusing to 
deal with smaller groups. By choosing not to distribute assets to traditional 
hapu, but to larger settlement entities, the Crown may be prejudicing the 
redevelopment, growth or even existence of these hapu. This would almost 
certainly be contrary to the aim of "tribal restoration" as detailed by the 
Waitangi Tribunal.209 
One example of where assets have been vested in a larger entity is the Ngai 
Tahu settlement, where various assets and taonga were vested in Te Runanga o 
Ngai Tahu. At the Committee of the Whole House stage, amendments were 
proposed to the settlement legislation that would instead vest these in 
hapu. 210 The rationale behind these amendments was to "turn back the clock 
and restore to those people the kaitiakitanga and the property right that was 
originally under the mana whenua of the tangata whenua of the hapu in these 
various different areas."211 
209 
See Waitangi Tribunal Turangi Township Remedies Report: Wai 84 (GP Publications, Wellington, 
1998), 2.6.3; Waitangi Tribunal Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Orakei Claim: Wai 7 (Brooker & 
Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1987), 14.2; Waitangi Tribunal Waiheke Report: Wai 10 (Brooker & Friend Ltd, 
Wellington , 1987), 41. 
2 10 In support of these amendments, Sandra Lee stated: "I think that the Committee should focus its mind 
on the fact that the tangata whenua---the real tangata whenua---should be given the right to be the kaitiaki 
of these properties, because it was those hapu who had the properties taken from them and were denied 
access to their food-gathering reserves in the first place. It was not a corporate body that was denied access; 
it was actual hapu that were denied the right to their reserves in the first place." - ( 17 September 1998) 571 
NZPD 12117. 
2 11 Sandra Lee (17 September 1998) 571 NZPD 12117-12118. 
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However, the amendments were rejected, and the legislation was passed, 
vesting the assets in Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu.212 Sandra Lee was incredulous 
at this: 213 
How can it be a treaty settlement when fundamental issues such as mahinga kai are 
being taken by the Crown and given to a corporate body at the expense of the people 
who were the original owners? ... They were identifiable then when they were taken, 
and their descendants are identifiable now ... They have an absolute right to be the 
guardians of that which is theirs. But, more important[ly ], may I say, they have a 
need as well. If this is meant to be a durable settlement, it should recognise that 
need. Those hapu depend on those mahinga kai areas. They have always sustained 
our people. They sustained us historically, and I can tell members from my personal 
experience as a member of Poutini Ngai Tahu that they sustain our people still. .. 
For the Crown to create a law that says that they have to go to a corporate body, 
created by the Crown and purporting to be the representatives of people for all 
purposes as the appropriate way to go about it, is even more onerous than the 
requirements for consultation under the Department of Conservation legislation. 
As this quote illustrates, by handing control of assets to larger groups the 
rights of hapu are compromised, and their ability to sustain themselves is 
tlu·eatened. If the effects predicted by Sandra Lee are borne out across the 
Country as a result of settlements, the prospects of a string of new Treaty 
grievances are increased. 
IX JUSTIFIED LIMITATIONS ON TREATY "RIGHTS"? 
If it is accepted that the policy as it stands either does, or may potentially, 
give rise to breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi, recent statements from the 
Waitangi Tribunal require that it is necessary to consider whether these can be 
justified.214 
212 see Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998. 
213 Sandra Lee (17 September 1998) 571 NZPD 12124. 
214 Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report: Wai 796 (Wellington, 2003), para 5.9-5.12. 
52 
The large natural groupings policy exists for a reason. Dealing with large 
groupings makes ostensibly ' full and final Treaty settlement' within a modest 
timeframe a realistic possibility. 
The political pressure for a full and final settlement is readily apparent. 
The Royal Commission on Social Policy in 1988 found that only twenty 
percent of non-Maori believed that historical Treaty grievances which required 
redress existed.215 While one might have expected the rate of acceptance of the 
need for redress to have increased as the settlement process proceeded, the 
evidence points to the contrary conclusion. A 1999 study showed that almost 
70 percent of a random survey of 1 OOO New Zealand households stated that 
they did not believe historical injustices should be remedied. 21 6 This sentiment 
can also be seen in the policies of many political parties. 217 
Further, the Waitangi Tribunal itself has noted that "[t]he focus on past 
grievances is dive1iing the energies of many Maori away from pressing social 
and economic needs and is preventing Maori from taking control of their own 
futures" .218 Thus, there is also an argument to be made that speedy 
settlements are desirable for Maori as well as for Pakeha. 
The question which arises is: does the end result of speedily obtaining 
"full and final" Treaty settlements justify the means taken to achieve it? If it 
does, then the dictation of a policy by the Government aimed at expediting the 
process could be justified. 
2 15 Royal Commission on Social Policy The April Report (Wellington, 1988) vol I, 532. 
2 16 see Kirsten S Carlson Rhetoric versus Reality: Sovereignty and Tino Rangatiratanga in Aotearoa New 
Zealand (MA Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1999). 
217 Notably the National Party, in its perhaps optimistically titled "Time to Move On" Policy on historical 
Treaty settlements for the 2002 General Election, which would have required all claims to be settled by the 
end of 2008. - see http://ww,1 .national. oq,:. n1/wco11 tent. asp9 Page l D= I 000049..i9 (Last Accessed I O June 
2003). 
2 18 Waitangi Tribunal Business Strategy 1998 (Wellington, 1998), 6. 
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A The Petroleum Report 
The Waitangi Tribunal recently addressed the issue of so called "justified 
limitations" on rights under the Treaty of Waitangi in its Petroleum Report.21 9 
Here, claimants alleged that the nationalisation of Petroleum resources 
pursuant to the Petroleum Act 193 7 was contrary to Treaty principles. The 
Crown argued that the expropriation of petroleum in the national interest was 
a valid exercise of Crown sovereignty under Article One of the Treaty. 220 
The Tribunal took the view that " [w]hile the Treaty guarantees were not 
absolute, they were fundamental" and that " [f]undamental guarantees cannot 
be overridden even by an informed government acting in good faith, except in 
exceptional circumstances".221 To determine if such 'exceptional 
circumstances' existed, the Tribunal took the novel approach of drawing an 
analogy with the approach taken by the Court of Appeal to justified 
limitations under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.222 
The Court of Appeal ' s approach was stated in Moonen v Film and 
Literature Board of Review as consisting of a four stage test: 223 
In determining whether an abrogation or limitation of a right or freedom can be 
justified in terms of s 5, it is desirable first to identify the objective which the 
legislature was endeavouring to achieve by the provision in question. The 
importance and significance of that objective must then be assessed. The way in 
which the objective is statutorily achieved must be in reasonable proportion to the 
importance of the objective. A sledgehammer should not be used to crack a nut. The 
means used must also have a rational relationship with the objective, and in 
achieving the objective there must be as little inte1ference as possible with the right 
2 19 Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report: Wai 796 (Wellington, 2003 ). 
220 Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report above, para 5.9. 
22 1 Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report above, para 5.10 . 
222 Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report above, para 5.12. 
223 see Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, I 6 (CA). 
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or freedom affected. Furthermore the limitation involved must be justifiable in light 
of the objective. 
Approving the Court of Appeal's test, the Waitangi Tribunal stated:224 
These ideas are broadly familiar in Treaty jurisprudence. When faced with an 
expropriatory statute, the question for this Tribunal reduces to whether the 
expropriation was reasonably necessary, or whether there was a reasonable alternative 
available which could have achieved the statutory objective without overriding the 
fundamental Treaty right. If some form of expropriation can be reasonably justified, 
the next question is what is the least interference necessary to achieve the policy 
objective of the statute. 
B Application to Settlement Policy 
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While the approach in the Petroleum Report was developed in the context 
of resource expropriation, it provides a useful lens through which to analyse 
the decision to negotiate only with ' large natural groupings'. 
As was noted above, it appears the large natural grouping policy exists 
largely to enhance the manageability of the Treaty settlement process by 
reducing the costs involved, and speeding up the process. This viewpoint has 
found some sympathy from the Waitangi Tribunal, which stated in the 
Pakakohi and Tangahoe Settlement Claims Report in 2000:225 
There appear to us to be sound practical and policy reasons for settling at iwi or 
hapu aggregation level where that is at all possible. As the Whanganui River 
Tribunal put it, ' While Maori custom generally favours autonomy, it also recognises 
that, on occasion, the hapu must operate collectively ' . 
224 Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report above, para 5.12. 
225 Waitangi Tribunal The Pakakohi and Tangahoe Settlement Claims Report: Wai 758 (Legislation Direct, 
Wellington, 2000), 65. 
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Consequently, the policy of settling with larger groupings does appear to 
be in pursuance of an important end ( at least from the Government, and the 
research suggests, from the public's perspective) - a speedy end to historical 
Treaty claims. However, following the Moonen approach, it is necessary to 
ensure that the extent of any Treaty breaches in furtherance of this policy are 
proportionate to its outcome. 
Key to the consideration of whether any breach is justified is whether the 
policy constitutes the least possible interference possible to the rights 
involved. 226 This falls to be examined by reference to the alternative 
approaches which could have been taken to the issue. 
C Alternatives 
I Structural Alternatives 
A number of ideas have been floated as to how to "fix" the problem of 
representation. On the more conservative end of this spectrum of possibilities, 
Alan Ward argues that smaller groups should have to pursue claims through an 
iwi structure, but argues that there is a "strong case for this mandating process 
to be overseen by an independent authority such as the District Court or the 
Electoral Commission".227 A similar result could be achieved by strengthening 
the powers of the Maori Land Court under section 30 of the Te Ture Whenua 
Maori Act. This would ameliorate some of the problems caused by the 
Court's inability and unwillingness to get involved in the process by giving 
disaffected groups a forum in which to air their concerns. 
A more radical solution is that favoured by Gover and Baird, who argue 
that the model of "democratic experimentalism" could be applied successfully 
226 See Moonen v Film and literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16 (CA) and Waitangi Tribunal 
Petroleum Report, above, para 5.12. 
227 Alan Ward, An Unsellled Histmy (Bridget Wi ll iams Books, Wellington, 1999) 177. 
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to the New Zealand situation.228 This model, developed by US academics 
Charles Sabel and Michael Dorf, essentially involves the devolution of 
governance tasks to individual groups so that they develop their own solutions 
to these issues.229 The role of central authorities is very limited - a "central 
monitor" is responsible for facilitating information sharing, and the Courts 
have a significantly reduced role. 230 
In the New Zealand situation, the "democratic experimentalism" model 
would allow an ongoing process whereby Maori, rather than the Crown, are 
empowered to define the identity of the Maori "Treaty partner" ( or, more 
properly, Treaty partners) based on the criteria they choose, thus reflecting 
both evolving cultural norms and tikanga.23 1 The outcome of such a process, 
argue Gover and Baird, is that groups possess a greater sense of ownership of 
the process, and that the partnership between Maori and the Crown "is able 
to evolve organically at a local level, reflecting changes to Maori 
organisation". 232 
2 Negotiation 
While such alternatives may be sufficient to solve some of the more 
immediate problems, perhaps the most obvious long-term alternative is to 
negotiate with claimants as to which group is most appropriate to conduct 
settlement negotiations with, free from any blanket rules such as the large 
natural grouping policy. 
As the Crown currently justifies the policy largely on the grounds of 
expedience, then surely this is a matter which should have been discussed with 
claimants prior to the blanket policy being promulgated. It would be very 
228 Kirsty Gover and Natalie Baird " Identifying the Maori Treaty Partner" (2002) 32 Univ of Toronto L J 
39. 
229 Charles Sabel and Michael Dorf "A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism" (I 998) 98 Col um L 
Rev 267. 
230 Gover and Baird, above, 41 . 
231 Gover and Baird, above, 41 . 
232 Gover and Baird, above, 41 . 
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difficult for the Crown to argue that it was impractical for it to enter into such 
discussions with Maori. While they might not have resulted in approval for 
the policy, a compromise may have been reached which could have 
ameliorated some of the problems with the current process. 
The need for such discussion was recognised by officials at the very onset 
of the direct settlement process, with cabinet papers noting that the issue of 
who to deal with "is likely to be particularly controversial for Maori and 
would require discussion and consultation". 233 Despite the identified need for 
such discussion, it has never occurred. 
A negotiation process would see a dialogue in which Maori and the Crown 
reach conclusions as to who negotiations are to be held with. Comments made 
by negotiation expert Ian MacDuff at the onset of the process are instructive. 
These urged that settlements not be seen as an end in and of themselves, and 
that the initial focus should be on determining how negotiations will be carried 
out, rather than what the outcome will necessarily be. 234 As MacDuff 
stated:235 
[i]t cannot be assumed that, for all that we have lived together for some time, we 
speak the same negotiation language, rely on the same protocols or expect the same 
things from negotiation . 
This conclusion was recently echoed by Craig Coxhead of Waikato 
University, who noted that: 236 
233 Officials Strategy Committee "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Fund: Size, Shape, Timescale and the 
Reciprocation from Maori" (28 June 1993) CSC (93) 90, para 67. 
234 Ian MacDuff"The Role of Negotiation: Negotiated Justice" in GeoffMcLay (ed) Treaty Settlements: 
The Unfinished Business (Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, Wellington, 1995) 55. 
2'.l 5 MacDuff, above, 55 ; see also Dimitri Geidelberg "Direct Negotiation with the Crown in Treaty of 
Waitangi Claims" (LLB(Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1997); Tirawhanaunga 
Johnson "Process issues in Crown/Maori Treaty Negotiations" (LLB(Hons) Research Paper, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 1996); Catherine Davis "The Crown 's D~velopmen~ ofi!s Proposal.s for the 
Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims" (LLM Research Paper, V1ctona Un1vers1ty of Wellmgton, 1996). 
236 Craig Cox head "Where are the Negotiations in the Direct Negotiations of Treaty Settlements?" (2002) 
I O Waikato LR 13, 32. 
[f]or a claims process to obtain some acceptance and approval from Maori, given 
past experience, it would seem certain that Maori will need to be involved in the 
future development of the claims process. As a major partner within the settlement 
process Maori need to be afforded the opportunity to participate in the development 
of the settlement processes. 
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It is difficult to speculate as to what the outcome of such a process might 
be, but it would certainly assist in identifying the best way to proceed. In the 
absence of such discussion, it would appear to be very difficult for the Crown 
to assert that its process was that which imposed the least interference on 
Treaty rights. 
D Balancing 
Any changes to the structural processes would almost certainly be more 
difficult, time consuming, and costly than the Crown's current policy. 
However, they provide a means by which settlements could be achieved 
without the problems associated with unilateral definition. 
It is very difficult to determine what precisely is required without entering 
into the negotiations which, as MacDuff and Cox.head point out, should have 
occU1Ted years ago. 
The proportionality exercise would require a balancing of whatever these 
additional costs are against the extent of any breaches of the Treaty. As 
discussed above, the scope for new grievances is large, and the effects of the 
policy are wide reaching. In many cases settlements have removed the ability 
of smaller groups to seek redress for their grievances. Given that the very basic 
step of negotiation was not taken, and has not been subsequently taken, it is 
very difficult to see how the Crown could seek to argue that its current policy 
can be seen as constituting the least possible interference to Treaty rights. 
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As such, the current settlement process may both create settlements that 
will not stand up, and also, in and of itself, create new Treaty grievances. 
X A WAY FORWARD? 
Given that the current process has some key flaws, it is necessary to at 
this point consider how these can be remedied, if the settlement process as a 
whole is not to be compromised. 
As noted above, there is an array of possibilities for change - ranging from 
minor tinkering with the current arrangement, such as that advocated by Alan 
Ward,237 to a more fundamental shift in the current stll:lctural arrangements, 
such as that proposed by Baird and Gover.238 
Sirnply picking one of these models and hailing it as a panacea for the ills 
of the process would be myopic. It would fail to recognise that one of the key 
problems with the current system is that the Crown has unilaterally imposed a 
process upon Maori. 
A better approach would be to conduct the negotiations which 
MacDuff239 and Coxhead240 argue should fom1 the basis of settlement policy. 
In this way, the interests and issues of both the Crown and claimants can be 
recognised and worked through. 
Past experience shows that this will be a slow and difficult process. Given 
the speed with which the cun-ent settlement process is progressing, it is a 
process which needs to be commenced urgently. 
237 Alan Ward An Unsettled History (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1999) 177. 
238 Kirsty Gover and Natalie Baird "Identifying the Maori Treaty Partner'' (2002) 32 Univ of Toronto LJ 
39. 
239 Ian MacDuff"The Role of Negotiation: Negotiated Justice" in GeoffMcLay (ed) Treaty Settlements: 
The Unfinished Business (Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, Wellington, 1995) 55. 
24° Craig Coxhead "Where are the Negotiations in the Direct Negotiations of Treaty Settlements?" (2002) 
l O Waikato LR l 3, 32. 
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X1 CONCLUSION 
The direct settlement process, which has developed over the past decade, 
has now crystallised into a series of policies aimed at providing redress for 
past Treaty of Waitangi grievances. Under these policies, the Crown is seeking 
to negotiate comprehensive settlements covering all of the claims in a given 
area. In order to ensure they are final , the Crown, upon settlement legislates to 
remove any avenue by which the settlement could be challenged or 
reconsidered. 
In the rush to achieve these settlements, the Crown has decided on a 
policy of negotiating only with "large natural groupings". The effect of the 
policy has been to shut out the smaller groups which traditionally dominated 
Maori society, unless they amalgamate into larger groups. The policy is not 
based on tikanga, or on a desire from Maori to be defined in this way, but 
exists simply because it is easier for the Crown to do so. 
The effects of the policy are increasingly manifesting themselves as the 
settlement process progresses. Recent years have seen a number of hapu 
whose claims have been sidelined by the process take their disputes through 
the Courts and Waitangi Tribunal only to find they are both unprepared and 
unwilling to help. 
Given that these groups are unwilling to negotiate within the structure 
imposed by the Crown, and are not assisted by the Courts, they are finding 
their access to redress abrogated by settlements negotiated without their 
consent or involvement. The frequency with which this occurs is likely to 
increase under the current Government' s policy of speeding up claims 
processes, especially in the behemoth Central North Island claim. 
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These problems raise two very important questions for the settlement 
process - whether the settlements will stand up, and whether the process is a 
breach of the Treaty in itself. 
History tells us that if settlement programs are not handled correctly, they 
will be inadequate and will have to be revisited by future Governments. The 
flaws with the current process are alienating many groups, creating a very real 
risk that some supposedly "full and final" settlements will prove not to be, 
and instead require re-opening and re-negotiation. 
Also, there is the very real possibility that the process itself is adversely 
affecting the redevelopment of traditional Maori social structures, and is 
therefore creating new Treaty grievances. While recent commentary from the 
Waitangi Tribunal suggests it may be possible to say such breaches are 
justifiable if they are in pursuit of an arguably desirable goal, such as final 
Treaty settlements, it is doubtful whether such a justification would apply to 
the current situation. 
Given the problems with the policy, it is surely incumbent upon the 
Office of Treaty Settlements to closely scrutinise this policy, and any 
alternatives, in order to ensure that it is both achieving its aim, and not simply 
creating new grievances while attempting to 'heal the past'. The best way to 
start this process is to do what should have been done almost a decade ago -
commence negotiations with claimants, free from the constraints of a non-
negotiable bottom line on the level at which negotiations will occur. 
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